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Like several other presidents -- especially Jefferson, Madison, Grant and
Hoover -- John Quincy Adams achieved his greatest distinction outside the White
House. The four years that Adams spent in the presidency at odds with a Congress
that refused to accept his nationalistic vision I were but an unhappy interlude in a long
career in which Adams distinguished himself as a diplomat, scholar and congress-
man. While Adams is remembered today for his numerous talents, his accomplish-
ments as a lawyer usually are not ranked prominently in accounts of his achieve-
ments. Yet Adams's legal career was notable in many ways, and William Howard
Taft is the only president whose record in the law decidedly outshines Adams's.
Adams received a solid legal education, argued several important cases before the
U.S. Supreme court and was the only president other than Taft to receive an appoint-
ment to the High Court. Like so many other presidents, however, Adams found the
study of law boring and frustrating, disdained the exigencies of private practice,
failed to make a good living at the bar, and gladly abandoned his practice for politics
on more than one occasion. Adams, like other presidents, also used his legal career
as a stepping stone into politics and then used his legal knowledge to advance
political causes.
The article will discuss Adams's legal education, his early legal practice, his
reasons for declining an appointment to the Supreme Court, and his role as counsel
in various cases decided by Supreme Court. Adams's legal education provides
insight into the nature of legal training in late eighteenth century America and the
legal profession during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Finally,
Adams's career at the Bar provides a means of evaluating various theses that have
been advanced concerning the influence of legal training on the performance of
presidents in office.
LEGAL EDUCATION
Adams's rather checkered legal career began auspiciously since Adams en-
joyed excellent preparation for his legal studies. Accompanying his parents to
*Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; A.B. Stanford, 1976, J.D.,
Harvard 1979.
For a recently published discussion and analysis of Adams's presidency, see M.W.M. HARGREAVES, THE
PRESIDENCY OF JOHN QUINcy ADAMS (1985).
1
Ross: John Quincy Adams
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
Europe on his father's diplomatic missions, Adams attended schools in Paris, Am-
sterdam and Leyden during his boyhood and at the age of fourteen became private
secretary to Francis Dana, the first American diplomat in Russia. Joining the junior
class at Harvard in 1785, Adams graduated two years later with highest honors.3
Ironically, however, the very richness of Adams's early education instilled in him a
taste for politics and an intellectual curiosity that left him unsuited for the plodding
tedium of the daily practice of law.
Marked by his Puritan lineage, Adams chose to become a lawyer more out of
a feeling of obligation than any special affinity for the law. In an address to the
Cincinnati bar near the end of his life, Adams recalled that his mother, the formidable
Abigail Adams, had impressed upon him that "in this country every man should
have some trade." 4 In performing what he described as "the duty of selecting a pro-
fession," the advice of his parents and his own inclination led him to the law.5 Since
Adams lived during an age when many a son followed his father's profession, it was
natural that Adams chose to enter the profession in which his father had distinguished
himself prior to his entry into politics. 6 Adams preferred to study law under the
tutelage of his father7 but John Adams's continued absence from the United States
as America's first ambassador to Great Britain made it impossible for John Quincy
to study at home. Although the nation's first law school had been established several
years earlier at Litchfield, Connecticut, Adams does not appear to have considered
studying at that institution or at the several American universities that offered law
lectures. 8 Since a minimum three year period of residency in an attorney's office was
a prerequisite for admission to the bar in most Massachusetts counties by the late
eighteenth century,9 it is not surprising that no law school had been established in
Massachusetts 0 or that Adams would have avoided formal training that only could
2 S. F. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 11-12 (1949) [here-
inafter BEMIS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY].
3 Id. at 19-21.
4 J. QUINCY, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 6 (1858).
Id.
6 For a summary of John Adams's busy and distinguished career at the bar, see I L.K. WROTH & H.B. ZOBEL,
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS lxx to xciv (1965).
' I THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 26 (W.C. Ford ed. 1913) [hereinafter WRITINGS]. The elderAdams's
extensive knowledge of the theory and practice of law would have enabled him to provide his son with
excellent instruction. Indeed, Adams pere had significantly contributed to the development of the legal
profession in Massachusetts by serving as a teacher to the clerks who worked in his office. WROTH & ZOBEL,
supra note 6, at lxxx to lxxxiv. Not only did Adams provide his clerks with a solid practical training, but he
also instilled in them an intellectual approach to the law. Id. at lxxxii. Many of his clerks went on to become
leaders of the bar. Id. at lxxxi to lxxxii. In addition to sharing with his students his own considerable learning
and experience in the law, Adams provided them with access to his excellent law library, which grew into
what Adams later described as the best in Massachusetts. Id. at lxxxv to lxxxvi.
8 For a discussion of legal instruction in American universities prior to 1800, see Thayer, The Teaching of
English Law at Universities, 9 HARv. L. REV. 169 (1895).
9 See G.W. GEWALT, MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF PROFESSIONALI-
ZATION, 1760-1840 (Unpubl. Ph.D. Diss. Clark U., 1969) at 133. Although a three-year term of study for
college graduates was required throughout the state, the length of apprenticeship for non-college graduates
varied between four and seven years. Id.
" The delay in the commencement of formal legal training in Massachusetts until the institution of the Royall
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have delayed his admission to practice. Accordingly, Adams followed the time-
honored custom of"reading law" in a private law office while serving as a law clerk.
Perhaps wanting to avoid the diversions and expense of Boston, Adams chose to go
to Newburyport to study law at the office of Theophilus Parsons. Whatever other
misgivings he may have had about his choice of a career, Adams at least was satisfied
at first with his choice of Parsons, a local luminary who later became chief justice
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Adams reflected in a journal that
he kept during his law student years upon the "great advantage" of studying in the
office of Parsons, whom Adams described as "in himself a law library, and...
proficient in every useful branch of science." Parsons's "chief excellency," in
Adams opinion, was that "no student can be more fond of proposing questions than
he is of solving them. He is never at a loss, and always gives a full and ample account,
not only of the subject proposed, but of all matters which have any intimate
connection with it."" In a letter to Abigail three months after his arrival in
Newburyport, Adams exulted that Parsons's "talents are great, his application has
been indefatigable, and his professional knowledge is surpassed by no gentleman in
the Commonwealth." 12 Adams soon discovered, however, that Parsons was not the
ideal tutor. On several occasions, Adams wrote in his diary that he and his fellow
clerks were distracted by Parsons's frequent conversations with visitors to the office.
Six months after his arrival in Newburyport, Adams noted that "if we complain, we
are told we must learn to read without suffering ourselves to be interrupted by any
noise whatever, a direction with which I believe I shall never be able to comply."1 
3
Adams testily concluded that" [ilt would be much more agreeable to me, if he would
lectures at Harvard in 1815 and the establishment of the Harvard Law School in 1817 is attributable to a
number of factors. Charles Warren attributed the delay to the conflict with England, the Embargo of 1808,
and the resulting economic disruption that depressed legal business. 1 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 285 (1908). More recently, Arthur Sutherland has
disagreed with Warren and attributed the delay to Harvard's belief that "if education was to be pracatical,
it would not be academically respectable; if it was to be respectably academic, it must be professionally
unprofitable." A.E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967 43-45
(1967). Another study of early legal education has concluded that Massachusetts lawyers themselves were
responsible for the delay since the bar regarded the apprenticeship system as a means of regulating and
restricting membership in the profession. Gewalt, Massachusetts Legal Education in Transition, 1766-1840,
17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 27, 28 (1973). The retention of the apprenticeship system also provided the bar with
a secure source of fees and free labor. Id. at 34.
" ADAMS PAPERS MICROFILM [hereinafter APM], Reel 15 (entry for Nov. 23, 1787). Reprinted by permission
of the publishers and the Massachusetts Historical Society from THE DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Vol. It,
David Grayson Allen, Robert J. Taylor, Marc Friedlaender, Celeste Walker, editors, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, Copyright, © 1981 by the Massachusetts Historical Society. The microfilms of
the Adams Family Papers were produced from manuscripts that are presently owned by the Massachusetts
Historical Society. Before it was placed on microfilm, part of Adams's diary was published as J.Q. ADAMS,
LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, 1787-1788 (1903). Adams's personal diary furnishes a rich source of
information concerning his days as a law student. The diary was the beginning of ajournal that Adams kept,
with only periodic interruptions, until the end of his life. The journal's copious information, graceful style,
and keen insights into the character of Adams and his contemporaries make it one of the most remarkable
documents of any American public figure. In reading its lively pages, one can only regret that it is impossible
to imagine that any recent American president could have produced such a journal.
12 1 WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 37 (J.Q. Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 23, 1787).
"1 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Mar. 26, 1788).
3
Ross: John Quincy Adams
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
receive his company in the other room, and spare us the trouble of an apprenticeship
to an art which we cannot acquire."' 4 Adams also complained that Parsons, "for
special reasons to him best known," refused to permit the clerks to build a fire in the
office when he was absent, thus forcing his clerks to depart as soon as the light began
to fade.'5
Upon arriving at Newburyport in the Autumn of 1787, Adams immediately
immersed himself in his work, studying eight hours daily at Parsons's office and
copying legal forms for more hours in his lodgings during the evening.' 6 Although
Adams managed to read all four volumes of Blackstone during his first two months
in Newburyport, 7 he began to despair that he ever could master the vast corpus of
the law. Attempting to place the best face on his situation and perhaps trying to
convince himself, Adams told Abigail that the study of law "is far from being so
destitute of entertainment as I had been led to expect." ' 8 Adams explained that his
"pleasure" and edification in -studying three or four authors had dispelled his
"imaginary terrors of tediousness and disgust." ' 9 Adams admitted that the growing
disrepute of lawyers in Massachusetts and the increasing competition for legal
business worried him.20 He later lamented that a "thousand lies [had prejudiced] the
people against the 'order' as [the profession] has invidiously been called; and as a
free people will not descend to disguise their sentiments, the gentlemen of the
profession have been treated with contemptuous neglect and with insulting abuse.'"2
Moreover, the number of lawyers was growing and "the little business to be done
is divided into so many shares, that they are in danger of starving one another." 2
Adams confessed that when he considered these disadvantages, he was "sometimes
almost discouraged, and ready to wish I had engaged in some other line of life.' '23
Adams insisted, however, that "I am determined not to despond. With industry and
frugality, with patience and perseverance, it will be very hard if I cannot go through
14 Id.
1 Id. (entry for Jan. 16, 1788).
16 Id.
'7 Id. (entry for Dec. 12, 1787).
"8 I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 37 (J.Q. Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 23, 1787).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 37-38. Although Adams was disposed to exaggerate the magnitude of his woes, his concern about
the growing antipathy toward the legal profession appears to have been rooted in reality. Although popular
antagonism toward the legal profession has been widespread throughout American history, it was especially
pronounced during the early years of the Republic. See M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING
SoclErY, 1776-1876,32-58 (1976); Chroust, The Dilemma of the American Lawyer in the Post-Revolutionary
Era, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW. 48,51-57 (1959); II A.H. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
passim (1965); GEWALT, MASSACHuseTrs LAWYERS, supra note 9, at 44-47. Adams's belief that the profession
was overcrowded is more problematical. The ranks of the elite bar were thin because so many upper class
lawyers had fled the nation during and immediately after the Revolution. See Chroust, Dilemma, supra, at
49-50. Although untrained lawyers continued to vex the elite bar, the county bar associations and the courts
were succeeding in establishing professional regulations. See GEWALT, MASSACHuSErrs LAWYERS, supra note
9, at 33-90.
2 LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, supra note 11, at 74.
22 I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 37-38 (J.Q. Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 23, 1787).
23 Id. at 38.
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the world with honor.
24
In his diary, however, Adams was not so sanguine. Quailing at the prospect
of undertaking "the study of a profession which alone ought to employ all the time
I can devote to study for twenty years," Adams scarcely had arrived in Newburyport
before he complained that "my eyes and my health begin to fail, and I do not feel
that ardor for application, which I should have, to be a man of science." 25 Passing
his "most agreeable hours" in wide-ranging discussions with his friends that
renewed "the recollection of those happy scenes which we have all gone through in
college." Adams could not muster the same enthusiasm for his studies and by early
December he experienced "a depression of spirits" that hindered his sleep.26 On a
cold day a week later, he wrote that "[t]he question, what I am to do in this world
recurs to me very frequently; and never without causing great anxiety, and a
depression of spirits. My prospects appear darker to me every day, and I am obliged
sometimes to drive the subject from my mind and to assume some more agreeable
train of thoughts.' '27
Since Adams's legal studies and clerical duties did not banish Adams's
worries, he placed himself in a more agreeable frame of mind by reading works of
history, philosophy and literature by various authors, including Virgil, Gibbon,
Shakespeare, Hume and Rousseau. 28 Indeed, Adams begrudged his legal studies the
time that they distracted from his more catholic intellectual interests. Expressing
regret that "I have so little time at my disposal," Adams exclaimed on Christmas
Day that "[a] thousand subjects call my attention, and excite my curiosity: most of
them I am obliged to pass from without noticing them at all; and the few to which
I can afford my leisure only lead me to regret that I cannot go deeper. The tedious
study of a profession, which requires indefatigable industry and incessant applica-
tion, is alone sufficient employment.'
29
Like law students of all times, Adams also sought relief from the drudgery of
his studies in an active social life. A busy commercial town of 5000 inhabitants,
Newburyport was not without its diversions even if it might have seemed a trifle dull
compared to Boston. Although the studious Adams was hardly transformed into a
man about town, Adams seems to have enjoyed more diversions as a law student than
he had known during his intense years at Harvard. Many evenings found him playing
24 Id. Adams added that "I am most resolutely determined not to spend my days in a dull tenor of insipidity.
I never shall be enough of a stoic to raise myself beyond the reach of fortune. But I hope I shall have so much
resolution as shall enable me to receive prosperity without growing giddy and extravagant, or adversity
without falling into despair." Id.
2 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Nov. 14, 1787).
26 Id. (entry for Dec. 6, 1787). Although Adams wrote that he previously often "felt dull, low spirited in a
manner out of tune," his present depression was "different from what I ever knew before." Id.
27 Id. (entry for Dec. 18, 1787). Adams observed that "I do not wish to look into futurity; and were the leaves
of fate to be opened before me, I should shrink from the perusal." Id.
28 Id., passim.
29 Id. (entry for Dec. 25, 1787).
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whist or backgammon, or dancing. Adams also seems to have enjoyed his rooming
arrangement. He boarded near Parsons's office, at the home of a Mrs. Leathers
whom Adams described in a letter to Abigail as "civil and obliging" and a "good
old woman, who even an hundred years ago would have stood in no danger of being
hanged for witchcraft. ' 3° It pleased Adams that Mrs. Leathers was "uncannily
silent," thereby freeing him from the "the impertinence of conversation." 31 But
Adams enjoyed conversation with Mrs. Leathers's only other boarder, a Dr.
Kilham.
3 2
As his studies progressed, however, Adams's depressions appear to have
become increasingly frequent and severe. In early January of 1788, he confided to
his diary that "I hope to [G]od I shall not go on in this way squandering week after
week, till at the end of three years I shall go out of the office as ignorant as I entered
it. I cannot, must not, be so negligent: all my hopes of going through the world in
any other than the most contemptible manner depend upon my own exertions, and
if I continue thus trifling away my time, I shall become an object of charity or at
least of pity." ' 33 Similarly, Adams lamented a week later that "[i]ndolence,
indolence, I fear, will be my ruin." 34 The following day, a day of snow followed by
steady rain, Adams complained that "I go but little into company, and yet I am not
industrious. I am recluse, without being studious; and I find myself equally deprived
of the pleasures of society, and of sweet communion with the mighty dead. I am no
stranger to the midnight lamp; yet I observe not that I make a rapid progress in any
laudable pursuit.' 35 The following week, Adams, feeling "dull and low spirited,"
wrote that he felt "no extraordinary inclination for study of any kind" and expressed
disappointment that he had failed to take advantage of the long winter evenings.36 He
observed that he was reading about eighty pages of Coke each week, but that he did
"not understand a quarter part of that."'37 Adams's supposed lack of progress
particularly vexed him because he seemed to be spending a goodly number of hours
in front of his books.
Although Adams's gloom may be traced partly to the intensity of purpose that
characterized so many members of the Adams family, and his self-derogating lam-
entations reflect his Puritan origins, the doubts and frustrations that Adams ex-
pressed during his first year of law study have a timeless tenor. Despite their archaic
style, Adams's writings seem strikingly modem in substance. Adams's genuine
doubts about his ability and stamina to master the vast corpus of an arcane discipline
were not so very different from the fears that vex many of today's law students.
30I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 38 (J.Q. Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 23, 1787).
31 Id.
32 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Dec. 19, 1788).
3 Id. (entry for Jan. 12, 1788).
I4 d. at 54 (entry for Jan. 15, 1788).
I5 d. (entry for Jan. 16, 1788).
36 Id. (entry for Jan. 26, 1788).
37 Id.
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Adams's somewhat overwrought account of his travail forms part of a tradition of
histrionic descriptions of initiations into the legal profession. One might wryly
describe Adams's journal as an eighteenth century version of John Osborn's Paper
Chase or Scott Turow's One L. Writings such as Adams's are a catharsis to
overburdened law freshmen and help to instill professional solidarity. Although
Adams ultimately may have suffered an extreme reaction to legal studies,38 his early
writings about his legal education provide a classic portrait of the harrowed
psychology of first-year law students.
Political events during 1787-88 also seem to have contributed to Adams's
melancholia. Skeptical of the proposed federal constitution, Adams was displeased
by the growing ascendancy of its proponents. 39 Although in February he greeted
with resignation the news of Massachusetts's ratification of the Constitution, de-
scribing himself as "converted but not convinced," 4" the triumph of the federalists
in his state clearly rankled him. His sense of isolation was compounded since his
father and Parsons staunchly supported the Constitution. Indeed, Parsons's support
for the Constitution seems to have diminished Adams's respect for his formerly
revered teacher and employer. 4'
Adams finally completed his reading of Coke in March, noting that the
volumes contained"a vast detail of law learning, but heaped up in such an incoherent
mass that I have derived very little benefit from it. [Ijndeed I think it a very improper
book to put in the hands of a student just entering the acquisition of the profession.' '42
Adams much preferred Blackstone's Commentaries and Wood's Institutes, which
he described as "an inestimable benefit to late students in the profession." 43 The
contrast between Coke and Blackstone, Adams wrote, was "like descending from
a rugged, dangerous and almost inaccessible mountain, into a beautiful plain, where
the unbounded prospect on every side presents the appearance of fertility."4
Adams's relief from the burden of Coke and the arrival of Spring may have
38 See notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
'9 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Feb. 7, 1788). Adams observed that he had "not been pleased"
with the system of government proposed by the constitution and that "my acquaintances have long since
branded me with the name of an antifederalist." Id. Adams's attitude may have been attributable in part
to his travels in Europe, where his observation of despotism and monarchy intensified his republicanism and
distrust of central authority. See R.E. EAST, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: THE CRITICAL YEARS 95 (1962).
10 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Feb. 6, 1788). Adams declared that "I think it my duty to submit
without murmering against what is not to be helped. Id. Although Adams's letters and journals do not make
frequent references to the ratification process, Adams was interested enough in it to make a trip to Exeter late
in February to listen to New Hampshire's debates on ratification. Id. (entries for Feb. 21 and 22, 1788).
I1 d. (entry for Feb. 11, 1788). Adams stated that Parsons, who had been a delegate to the state convention,
"speaks with pleasure of every little trifling intrigue which served to baffle the intentions of the antifederalists
though many of them to me exhibit a meanness which I think I scarcely should expect a man would boast."
Adams concluded that "Parsons makes of the science of politics the science of little insignificant intrigue
and chicanery." Id. See also EAST, supra note 39, at 96.
42 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Mar. 8, 1788).
43 Id.
4 Id.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMSSpring, 1990]
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provided some respite from his depression. Early in April, he wrote that "according
to the different temperatures of my spirits, I am sometimes elated with hope,
sometimes contented with indifference, but often tormented with fears and de-
pressed."45 Although an illness in May renewed his depression, his spirits were
buoyed again by a five-week trip to Braintree to visit his parents after their long
sojourn in England. Although Adams intended to continue his legal studies during
his visit to Braintree, he soon resigned himself to taking a vacation.4 6 On his twenty-
first birthday, which he spent in Braintree, he resolved to alter his plan of study:
instead of confining himself exclusively to the law, he would devote "some part of
each day to studies of a lighter [and] more entertaining kind." 47 Since, as we have
seen, Adams already had found much time to read literature and history, one suspects
that Adams real intention was to devote himself less slavishly to his legal studies.
Adams's taste for legal studies do not appear to have increased as he grew older;
during middle age, he fell asleep while visiting a lecture at the Harvard Law School.4 8
Even if Adams intended to relax his legal studies, his old problems returned
to plague him when he returned to Newburyport. During the Summer, he spent much
of his time not on his law studies but on an address that he delivered in September
to the Phi Beta Kappa chapter in Cambridge. Although the speech was a triumph,
it was followed by rapid deterioration of spirits and severe insomnia that culminated
in a form of nervous breakdown. An opiate prescribed by a physician in mid-
September and a visit to an uncle in Haverhill provided only temporary relief for his
tension.49 By October 1, he wrote that "[i]n the present situation of my health I
cannot possibly attend at all to study." 0 Two days later, he retreated to Braintree,
where he remained until March of 1789, except for a few weeks during the winter
when he made a half-hearted attempt at continuing his legal studies in Newburyport.5 '
During his extended vacation in Braintree, Adams appears to have devoted himself
largely to the pleasures of reading, riding, skating, partying and hunting for
partridges and quails.52
Adams managed, however, to continue his legal education at a reduced pace,
studying Barrington's Observations on the Statutes, Foster's Crown Law and
Buller's Nisi Prius.5 3 Although Adams's abbreviation of his diary entries following
his return to Newburyport deprives us of detailed knowledge of his activities during
his final year as a law students, he appears without regret to have resigned himself
to a less rigorous schedule of work and study. His diary records an active social life
4I id. (entry for April 5, 1788).
I d. (entry for June 23, 1788).
17 Id. (entry for July It, 1788).
48 R.K. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 254 (1985).
49 See APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Sept. 13, 1788).
I ld. (entry for Oct. 1, 1788).
5' LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, supra note 11, at 168-69 (editor's note).
52 Id. at 169 (editor's note).
13 Id. at 168-69.
[Vol. 23:3
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and increased interest in feminine company.54 By June 1789, Adams wrote to his
father that his health had "been restored beyond my expectations, and I have been
able... to study than I had hoped to when I left Braintree.' 55 Like many law students,
however, Adams despaired that his academic training had not sufficiently prepared
him for the nuts and bolts of practice and he observed that "[t]he skill to apply
general knowledge to particular cases is no less important than the knowledge itself;
and a new piece of mechanism will often perform its operations with great
irregularity, however well it may be constructed."
5 6
Adams's last year of legal studies appears to have passed uneventfully. Al-
though he appears to have suffered again from insomnia from September until mid-
November of 1789, his health and spirits later improved. His journal entries, now
attenuated, record little of work or study but suggest that he enjoyed an active social
life.
In deciding where to set up his practice, Adams considered Newburyport,
where he observed that "a residence of three years has already made me better
known than I should be in any other situation, and where an agreeable circle of
acquaintance would render the station peculiarly pleasing.' " But Adams concluded
that "it must be a folly to expect encouragement for a youth "in a town that already
had three lawyers in addition to Parsons.' '58 Although Adams considered Braintree,
he did not wish to compete with his cousin William Cranch, who intended to
establish his practice there since "by opening offices in the same town we could only
divide the small pittance which either of us singly might obtain." 59 Accordingly,
Adams chose, almost by the process of elimination, to settle in Boston. He told his
father, perhaps somewhat disingenuously, that "I trust the opportunities and
temptations to dissipation, which I shall probably find there, have no influence upon
my determination, unless to increase the reluctance with which I make it." 6
ADAMS'S EARLY BOSTON PRACTICE
Adams began his practice of law in Boston in August 1790, the month after he
was admitted to the Massachusetts bar. In his 1843 address to the Cincinnati bar,
Adams explained that his father's political prominence did not generate clients since
John Adams had so long been absent from the United States and continued to remain
away from the Boston area. Adams recalled that "I went, therefore, as a volunteer,
an adventurer, to Boston ... I was without support of any kind. I may say I was a
Id. at 169-70 (editor's note).
I WRInNGS, supra note 7, at 40 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, June 28, 1789).
56 Id.
I Id. at 45 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, Mar. 19, 1790).
5 Id. at 46.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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stranger in that city, although almost a native of that spot.' '61 Of course, Adams was
not nearly so bereft of support. As the son of the vice president, he inevitably enjoyed
a considerable prominence and he himself was well acquainted with many luminar-
ies of the bar of the Boston area. During his law student days he often had socialized
with prominent judges and on at least one occasion he had dined with the state
attorney general.62 Moreover, the fledgling lawyer enjoyed more assistance from his
family than the honor of its name. Adams opened an office in a house, on Court
Street, that belonged to his father and he stocked his bookshelves with volumes from
his father's excellent law library, which Adams admitted at the time "will give me
perhaps some opportunities, which few of the young gentlemen of the profession
have possessed." 63 Indeed, Adams's family continued to be his principal source of
financial support since Abigail convinced John during the Spring of 1791 to provide
their son with a quarterly stipend of twenty-five pounds in return for his help with
the family's Boston estate.61 Adams was fortunate to enjoy such support, since he
suffered at first from a paucity of clients. Indeed, Adams told the Cincinnati bar that
"I can hardly call it a practice, because for the space of one year ... it would be
difficult for me to name any practice which I had to do. For two years, indeed, I can
recall nothing in which I was engaged that might be termed practice, though during
the second year there were some symptoms that by persevering patience practice
might come in time. The third year I continued this patience and perseverance, and,
having little to do, occupied my time in the study of those laws and institutions which
I have since been called to administer. At the end of the third year I had obtained
something which might be called a practice.' '65
Although Adams was not overwhelmed with legal business during his first
years in Boston, his progress was not quite so slow as he recollected. His carefully
maintained account books indicate that he had little business during his first sixteen
months in practice, but that the volume of his work increased markedly during 1792
and continued to grow at a healthy pace. The following chart of fees received by
Adams traces his progress: 66
Amount of Fees Collected Number of Fees
Aug.-Dec. 1790 2 pounds, 8 shillings 4
1791 6 pounds, 10 shillings 8
1792 77 pounds, I I shillings 62
1793 222 pounds, 4 shillings 94
Jan.-June 1794 170 pounds, 11 shillings 77
61 QUINCY, supra note 4, at 7.
62 APM, supra note 11, Reel 15 (entry for Mar. 5, 1789).
6I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 47 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, Mar. 19, 1790).
6 M.B. HECHT, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 65 (1972).
65 QUINCY, supra note 4, at 7.
6 See APM, supra note 11, Reel 215.
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Although comparisons are difficult to make, Adams's income in 1793 was
roughly the equivalent of approximately $60,000 in today's money. Although
Adams, of course, was not taxed on this income, his income was not sheer profit
because he had to pay overhead expenses. Adams's accounts from the second period
of his practice a decade later suggests that his net income probably was about two-
thirds of his gross income.67 This would still have left Adams in his third full year
of practice with an income equivalent to a present-day after-tax income of $40,000.
In addition to comparing favorably with the income of a junior practitioner today,
Adams's income also was relatively high by the standards of late eighteenth century
America. 68
Like most lawyers of the era, Adams had a diverse practice. Adams dispensed
advice to clients, prepared writs, drafted wills, and handled a substantial amount of
litigation that frequently required him to go to court. Although most of Adams's
business seems to have involved commercial matters, he helped at least two clients
with naturalization proceedings and prepared petitions to Congress for at least two
others.
69
Adams tried his first case two months after establishing his practice, address-
ing a jury for fifteen minutes in the Court of Common Pleas.70 Adams confided in
a letter to his mother that he had been "too much agitated to be possessed of a proper
presence of mind" since he received the case on three hours' notice.71 Adams also
might have been daunted because his opponent was Harrison Gray Otis, who already
had begun to develop a formidable reputation even though he was only two years
older than Adams. 72 Charles Adams assured his brother that his first effort probably
was not so bad and tried to console him by observing that "[t]he person who is
unintimidated upon such occasions has not the common feelings of human na-
ture." 73 But the incident appears to have distressed John Adams, who reported to
John Quincy that a friend had written to him "that your diffidence was remarked and
your tremor observed, when you opened at the Bar.' 
74
67 See note 107, infra, and accompanying text.
61 There is a paucity of information concerning professional incomes during this period. Since most records
of income are those of successful lawyers, existing documents provide few clues about average incomes or
income ranges. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that most lawyers did not make substantial incomes
from their practices. See Gewalt, Massachusetts Legal Education, supra note 10, at 219-21; I CHROUST, THE
RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 20, at 87-90. Examples of the income of successful attorneys
suggest that Adams's income was not insubstantial. John Marshall's income in 1793 and 1794, after he had
practiced law for a decade, was about 400 pounds, after expenses; Marshall's income had been about twice
as high a few years earlier. Id. at 87-88. During Thomas Jefferson's third year of full time practice, in 1770,
he had collected 213 pounds out of 521 pounds owed to him. Id. Patrick Henry collected 260 pounds out
of annual fees of 425 pounds. Id.
69 APM, supra note 11, Reel 215.
70 I WRImNGS, supra note 7, at 61 & n.1.
11 Id. at 61.
72 HECHT, supra note 64, at 64.
7 I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 61 n.l (Charles Adams to J.Q. Adams, Oct. 21, 1790).
'I Id. (John Adams to J.Q. Adams, Dec. 17, 1790).
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With time to spare throughout his early years at the bar, Adams maintained an
active social life and rekindled his literary and scholarly ambitions. During June and
July of 1791, he published in the Columbian Centinel a series of eleven essays
attacking Thomas Paine's defense of the French Revolution in The Rights of Man,
which in turn had been composed in response to Edmund Burke's pamphlet
opposing the Revolution. Written under the pseudonym Publicola, the essays widely
were assumed to have been authored by John Adams,75 an outspoken opponent of the
French Revolution who was widely criticized for his sympathies toward Great
Britain. The essays were a skillful, learned, biting and often wry defense of the
American political system. Adams wrote that "[t]he Constitution of the United
States appears to me to unite all the advantages, both of the French and of the English,
while it has avoided the evils of both. By that Constitution, the people have
delegated the power of alteration, by vesting it in the Congress, together with the
State Legislatures; while at the same time it has provided for alterations by the people
themselves in their original character, whenever it shall evidently appear to be the
wish of the people to make them." 76 Although Adams's legal education may have
informed his essays and he relied upon Blackstone as authority for one point, the
essays as a whole reflected Adams's intense interest in political philosophy rather
than any learning in the law.
In 1793, the Columbian Centinel published another series of articles by
Adams, who under the name Marcellus defended Washington's recent declaration
of neutrality in the war between Britain and France. Pointing out that the infant
republic's twelve hundred miles of coastline were vulnerable to foreign invasion,77
Adams declared that the nation's "happiness consists in a real independence,
disconnected from all European interests and European politics" and that "it is our
duty to remain, the peaceable and silent, though sorrowful spectators of the
sanguinary scene.' '78
Adams reiterated this time theme in another series of articles published in
November and December 1793, when he castigated the French minister to the United
State, Edmund "Citizen" Genet, who toured the nation in an effort to muster support
for France's war against Great Britain. Adams particularly denounced Genet for
challenging the authority of President Washington by asking the people to demand
that he call Congress into special session. Adams declared that "[tjhe interference
of foreigners upon any pretence whatever, in the dissensions of fellow-citizens, must
be as inevitably fatal to the liberties of the State, as the admission of strangers to
arbitrate upon the domestic differences of man and wife is destructive to the
happiness of a private family." 79
7 HECHr, supra note 64, at 68.
76 WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 91-92 (Letter of Publicola, Columbian Centinel, July 2, 1791).
17 Id. at 142 (Letter of Marcellus, Columbian Centinel, May 4, 1793).
78 Id. at 140.
79 Id. at 159 (Letter of Columbus, Columbian Centinel, Dec. 4, 1793).
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Adams's other major literary effort during his leisurely years of legal practice
defended the theater in Massachusetts against Attorney General James Sullivan,
who had enforced the state's prohibition against the theater by arresting an actor
during a performance at a newly opened "underground" playhouse in Boston. Like
Adams's other essays, this article reflected Adams's interest in political science
more than his training in taw, but the article was more directly concerned with legal
issues than were the other articles. Defending the civil disobedience of the theater
owner, Adams wrote that "[t]he constitution of this State is expressly paramount to
the laws of the legislature, and every individual in the community has the same right
with the legislature to put his own honest construction upon every clause contained
in the constitution.' '80 Adams argued that "if that construction militates with that
of the legislature, he has an indisputable right to violate their laws predicated upon
their construction.' 8
In addition to his literary and journalistic activities, Adams busied himself by
participating in local politics. He served on a committee to effect the incorporation
of the northern part of Braintree into Quincy and he sat on another committee that
studied the possibility of police reform. Adams preferred, however, not to immerse
himself too deeply in politics. He confided to his father that he wished to establish
financial independence before embarking upon a public career since he did not wish
to be "completely in the power of the people." 82 Adams also recognized that
political or literary activities might unduly retard his development as an attorney, the
occupation for which he depended "not only for my reputation, but for my
subsistence.' '83
A journal that Adams kept during the Spring of 1792 as he approached the age
of twenty-five -- an age by which many men in the eighteenth century had attained
considerable eminence--revealed his frustration over the slow progress of his legal
career and his grim resolve to continue plodding. In a particularly doleful entry on
May 16, 1792, Adams lamented that his poor use of time was "calculated to keep
me forever in that state of useless and disgraceful insignificance which has been my
lot for some years past."'84 Noting that many of his contemporaries already had dis-
tinguished themselves in the world, Adams averred that "I still find myself as
obscure [and] unknown to the world, as the most indolent or the most stupid of
human beings. In the walks of active life, I have done nothing." While Adams
described his ambition as "constant and unceasing," he regretted that his exertions
were "feeble, indolent, frequently interrupted, and never pursued with an ardor
equivalent to its purposes." 85 Continuing his education, Adams continued to read
widely in both law and literature. He continued to prefer the latter. Adams noted that
80 Id. at 127. (Letter of Menander, Columbian Centinel, Dec. 19, 1792).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 186. (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, Apr. 22, 1794).
83 APM, supra note 11, Reel 20 (entry for May 16, 1792).
4 id.
85 Id.
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"[t]he professional studies are tedious: they require some certain object, some focus
upon which to collect the rays of application." ,86 In an echo of his years in Parsons's
office, Adams cried, "Support me ye powers of patience, through these sandy
deserts of legal study, from whence I am to pick up a scanty subsistence by forcing
an unnatural cultivation.' '87
By the fourth year of his law practice, Adams finally began to reap the rewards
of his years of patience. As he recalled in 1843, he found his practice "swelling to
such an extent that I felt no longer any concern as to my future destiny as a member
of that profession.' '88 At the age of twenty-seven, Adams finally was able to tell his
father that he no longer would need his allowance. 89 With characteristic Adams
circumspection, however, John Quincy wrote to his father that while the legal
profession "gives me bread," he feared that his satisfaction with his success would
make him "indolent and listless." 90 It is therefore not surprising that Adams in May
1794 accepted with alacrity President Washington's appointment as minister to the
Netherlands. The appointment was attributable in large measure to Washington's
gratitude for Adams's help in stemming public support for Genet, although the
Senate's unanimous confirmation of the appointment indicates that Adams's abili-
ties enjoyed bi-partisan recognition. Adams's lack of clients therefore appears to
have been a blessing in disguise, for it gave him the leisure to publish the articles that
led to a long and distinguished diplomatic and political career which better suited his
tastes and talents than did the practice of law. In comparing his legal and diplomatic
careers, Adams observed late in his life that the latter was "not, perhaps, of more
usefulness, but of greater consequence in the eyes of mankind[.J 91 Adams
contended, however, that his "education at the bar, if not an indispensable qualifi-
cation, was at least a useful appendage" to his diplomatic career.92
Adams's willingness to take the post in the Netherlands further underscored
his distaste for the practice of law inasmuch as Adams believed that he could not
easily resume his legal career after his tour of duty abroad ended. Adams wrote to
his father shortly before he sailed for Europe that he could not return to the practice
of law "without losing many of the advantages which rendered its practice
tolerable." 9 3 After acquiring what he described as a "confined and limited"
reputation only after "four years of constant application and attention to business,"
Adams contended that" [m]y absence will not only stop its growth, but will carry me
back to that obscurity in which I began." 94 Observing that his new duties would
88 Id. (entry for May 3, 1792).
87 Id. (entry for May 4, 1792).
88 QUINCY, supra note 4, at 7-8.
89 HECHT, supra note 64, at 76.
' I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 185 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, April 12, 1794).
9' QUINCY, supra note 4, at 8.
92 Id.
13 I WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 194 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, July 27, 1794).
94 Id. at 195.
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"have very little affinity with those of the practicing lawyer," Adams contended that
his absence from the law would dull his legal acumen.9 After noting drily that he
doubted whether he would wish to devote his few leisure hours in the Netherlands
to the study of Littleton's Tenures or Coke's Commentaries, Adams predicted that
"two or three years' intermission will have the double effect of disgusting me with
them, and of disqualifying me from the practice of the law without a redoubled
application to them." 96 Adams also recognized that his contemporaries at the bar
would continue to advance in their careers during his absence and that "in returning
to the bar I shall descend as much below the level of my ambition and pretensions
as I have been by my present appointment raised above it." 97 With perhaps undue
pessimism, Adams told his father that "I have abandoned the profession upon which
I have hitherto depended for a future subsistence. Abandoned it at a time when the
tedious novitiate of hope and fear was nearly past; when flattering and brightening
prospects were every day opening more and more extensively to my own view; when
I was at least upon a footing of equal advantage with any one of my standing in the
profession, and advancing if not rapidly at least with regular progression towards
eminence; when the reward of long and painful expectation began to unfold itself to
my sight and give me a rational hope of future possession. At this critical moment
... I have stopped short in my career, forsaken the path which would have led me
to independence and security in private life, and stepped into a totally different
direction."98
Despite all of these misgivings, however, Adams concluded that his accep-
tance of the diplomatic post was "infinitely preferable" to remaining at the bar "to
perform duties which may be executed equally well by any other man.' -9 It is natural
that Adams chafed under the yoke of legal practice since his father's high govern-
mental positions and his own experiences as a boy in Europe had exposed him to a
more exciting way of life. As one of Adams's biographers aptly observed, -[h]e had
begun his connection with public affairs so early, had been so intimately associated
with important events concerning his country's welfare while still so young, that he
felt he was frittering away his life. What to a young man reared in more normal
circumstances would have appeared a perfectly natural period of youthful develop-
ment seemed to him a time of mature obscurity. "1°
ADAMS'S SECOND CAREER AT THE BAR
Although Adams recalled late in life that his assignment to The Hague indeed




98 Id. at 194.
99 Id. at 196.
100 B.C. CLARK, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 39 (1932).
'0' QUINCY, supra note 4, at 8.
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commencement of his diplomatic career did not in fact mark the end of his legal
career, even though he never again considered the law to be his principal occupation.
After spending nearly seven years abroad as diplomat, serving as minister to Prussia
after the completion of his duties in the Netherlands, Adams briefly resumed the
practice of law in Boston when he returned to the United States in 1801. Contrary
to his fears when he had left Boston for The Hague, Adams was able to establish a
successful practice at once, partly because of his public prominence but also because
U.S. District Court Judge John Davis appointed Adams as Commissioner in Bank-
ruptcy as a political favor for his appointment to the bench by John Adams. 1°2 John
Quincy Adams also was prominently mentioned in 1801 for a seat on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts but he expressed disinterest in the post, 103 a lack of
interest that probably is attributable to his general distaste for the law. Although
Adams continued to practice law for eight years, until he was named ambassador to
Russia in 1809, Adams spent most of those years immersed in politics and
scholarship and had little enthusiasm for the practice of law. As Professor Bemis has
observed, "[t]he retired diplomat bent his body over the grindstone of the law, but
the political urge kept stirring in his breast." ' 4  After serving briefly in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, Adams served in the United States Senate
from 1803 to 1808 and from 1806 to 1809 he was a professor of rhetoric at Harvard.
Setting up shop beneath the Columbian Centinal's printing office on State
Street, 10 5 Adams conducted a practice that seems to have picked up where his earlier
practice had left off. Adams's practice was primarily commercial. He drafted
indentures, deeds and mortgages and handled a substantial volume of litigation. 106
His efforts generated moderate pecuniary rewards that appear to have given him an
income that was fairly average for Boston attorneys during this time. In 1802, the
only year during this period when the law was Adams's principal occupation,
Adams's gross receipts from his practice amounted to $1646.80. His expenses
amounted to $684.61, leaving a net profit of $962.19. I°7 Since the typical income of
a lawyer in early nineteenth century Massachusetts has been estimated at "well
under $1000 per year," 108 Adams seems to have immediately established a solid
practice. Despite his political eminence, however, Adams did not establish an
especially lucrative practice.109
102 CLARK, supra note 100, at 68.
03 See IV WRrnNGS, supra note 7, at 95 (J.Q. Adams to James Madison, June 3, 1811).
"'a BEMIS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 2, at 112.
105 APM, supra note 11, Reel 135 (J.Q. Adams to William Gray, Mar. 19, 1802).
Io d. Reel 215.
I id. Some of Adams's expenses during the year 1802 involved the re-establishment of his business. He
paid, for example, one dollar for the installation of his sign and also purchased some office furniture and a
number of books. Adams also paid one hundred dollars for his annual rent. Id.
10s Gewalt, Massachusetts Legal Education, supra note 10, at 220. Gewalt's conclusion, an educated guess
based upon the small sampling of extant sources, seems reasonable. Gewalt does not explain whether he
refers to gross income or net profit.
09 Joseph Story, for example, earned slightly less than $7000 from his practice in Massachusetts in 1811.
II CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 20, at 89 n.305. Alexander James Dallas of
Philadelphia was earning about $10,000 by 1801. Id. at 88-89.
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Even though Adams's political and academic duties occupied most of his time
after 1802, Adams had the distinction during this time of arguing several cases before
the United States Supreme Court. The cases all involved commercial matters. One
of the cases, Fletcher v. Peck,' 0 was one of the most important cases in American
history because the Court's final decision unequivocally established the principle
that the Supreme Court has the right to invalidate an act of a state legislature that
conflicts with the U.S. Constitution and presented a ringing defense of vested
property rights. Fletcher was an action by the purchaser of land in Georgia to recover
his money on the ground that the seller's title was invalid because the Georgia
legislature had rescinded the statute pursuant to which the seller had obtained the
land."' The Georgia legislature had rescinded the statute in the wake of a scandal
over the bribes that land speculators had paid to legislators to obtain title to 35 million
acres of lands in western Georgia. Adams represented the seller of the land and
argued before the Court during the Winter of 1809 that the state of Georgia had valid
title to the land and that the act of rescission was invalid. In a characteristic
depreciation of his legal abilities, Adams confided to his journal that "I was under
the usual embarrassment which I have always experienced in public speaking, and
notwithstanding all the pains I have taken, not sufficiently clear in my arrangement
and method. In point of effect I was apparently not forceful, and in my exposition,
dull and tedious almost beyond endurance." "1 2 Although the Court ruled against the
seller because of a technical defect in its pleading," 3 Chief Justice Marshall indicated
in oral remarks from the bench that the Court nevertheless favored the substantive
arguments advanced by Adams and the case remained on the docket after the parties
amended their pleadings." 4 When the case was re-argued in 1810, however, Adams
did not participate inasmuch as he was in St. Petersburg serving as ambassador to
Russia. His place was taken by Joseph Story, who the following year began his
distinguished thirty-four year tenure on the Court. In a landmark opinion following
Story's argument, Marshall declared that the Court could not entertain the pur-
chaser's claim that the original granting law was invalid because it had been procured
by fraud and corruption. The act of rescission was unconstitutional because it
violated vested rights, the underlying principles of society and government, and the
clause of the Constitution that prohibits any state from impairing any obligation
arising under a contract. " 5
Although Adams is generally regarded as an example of public and private
probity," 1 6 Adams may have engaged in questionable ethics in the Fletcher case
110 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
1 For a general discussion of the case, see C.P. MAGRATH, YAzoo: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEw REPUBLIC,
THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966).
112 APM, supra note 11, Reel 30 (entry for Mar. 2, 1809).
113 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 125. Marshall ruled that Peck's answer was insufficient as a matter of
law because the defense that the governor had authority to convey the land did not necessarily deny the claim
that the legislature lacked the power to sell the land.
I4 APM, supra note I1, Reel 30 (entry for Mar. II, 1809).
115 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87.
116 An example of Adams's concern about avoiding possible conflicts of interest in his law practice arose in
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inasmuch as he probably recognized that there was no actual controversy between
the parties to the case. Since both sides appear to have been striving for the same
result -- an adjudication that the plaintiff had proper title to the land -- the action may
have been the sort of" feigned case" that the Supreme Court is loath to adjudicate. 17
Adams observed in his diary that Justice Livingston remarked to him at President
Madison's inaugural ball shortly after Adams's argument of the case that the Court
had been reluctant to decide the case at all "as it appeared manifestly made up for
the purpose of getting the Court's judgment on all the points.""18
During the same term that he argued Fletcher v. Peck, Adams argued another
case, Hope Insurance Company v. Boardman," I9 that involved important questions
about the jurisdiction of federal courts. In Boardman, the defendant, a Rhode Island
corporation, had argued on appeal that federal courts had no jurisdiction over the
claim of the plaintiffs, who were two merchants residing in Massachusetts, because
the complaint failed to aver the citizenship of the individuals who composed the
defendant corporation. According to the defendants, the failure to aver the citizen-
ship of those individuals contravened decisions of the Supreme Court in Bingham v.
Cabot H, which had required an affirmative pleading of citizenship in cases in which
federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship, 2 ° and Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, which had established the rule that complete diversity must exist between
all plaintiffs and all defendants. 2 ' In urging the Court to reject the defendant's
argument that Bingham v. Cabot H required the plaintiff to allege the citizenship of
the individual members of the corporation, Adams asserted that the defendant's con-
tention was at odds with the very concept of corporate status. Adams explained that
1804, when Adams informed Rufus Greene Amory, who had asked Adams to obtain a document to be used
as evidence in two insurance cases, that he had acted as counsel for underwriters the previous summer in a
case that was ending in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Although Adams stated that he did
not know whether there was any distinction between that case and the cases for which Amory wished to
receive the evidence, Adams explained that" I mention it, first as a reason which would induce me to decline
charging any thing, for any service on the side opposed to that for which I was engaged, even if I thought I
could fairly make a charge in such a case on any consideration; and secondly, that in any communications
to me on the subject you may be aware of the relation in which I stood to the question upon those policies."
APM, supra note It, Reel 135 (J.Q. Adams to Rufus Greene Amory, Mar. 6, 1804).
17 See MAGRATH, supra note 111, at 65, 67-68. MaGrath published for the first time an "Agreement of
Counsel" signed by Martin for Fletcher and John Quincy Adams for Peck that seems to suggest that the
parties colluded to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court. The parties waived all exceptions to the
pleading and submitted the case to the Court upon the covenants contained in Fletcher's declaration and the
facts stated in the special verdict of the parties.
11 APM, supra note 11, Reel 30 (entry for Mar. 7, 1809). Adams recorded that Chief Justice Marshall had
made a similar remark to Cranch. Likewise, in his concurring decision in the case the following year, Justice
Johnson stated that "I have been very unwilling to proceed to the decision of this cause at all. It appears to
me to be strong evidence, upon the face of it, of being a mere feigned case. It is our duty to decide on the
rights but not on the speculations of parties. My confidence, however, in the respectable gentlemen who have
been engaged for the parties, has induced me to abandon my scruples, in the belief that they would never
consent to impose a mere feigned case upon this court." Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147-48.
"9 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57 (1809).
z2 Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798). The Court had rendered an earlier decision in the same
case, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 19 (1795).
2I Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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"[i]t is the body politic, the moral person, that sues" rather than the individuals who
compose the corporation.1 12 "Its powers, its duties and capacities are different from
those of the individuals of whom it is composed,"' 123 Adams stated. "It can neither
derive benefit from the privileges, nor suffer injury by the incapacities, of any of
those individuals.' 1 24 With some exaggeration, Adams declared that the defen-
dant's objection would exclude all corporations from the federal courts.125 Adams
reasoned that the individual members of corporations constantly changed and that
the rule urged by the defendants would permit corporate defendants to evade the
jurisdiction of the federal courts by taking in a new member who was a citizen of the
plaintiff's state. 26 Adams argued that the principle of diversity jurisdiction "applies
with the greatest force to the case of a powerful moneyed corporation erected within,
and under the laws of a particular state."1 27 Adams explained that " [if there was
a probability that an individual citizen of a state could influence the state courts in
his favour, how much stronger is the probability that they could be influenced in
favour of a powerful moneyed institution which might be composed of the most
influential characters in the state."'128 "What chance for justice," Adams asked,
"could a plaintiff have against such a powerful association in the courts of a small
state whose judges perhaps were annually elected, or held their offices at the will of
the legislature?" 129
Adams's argument in favor of broad federal jurisdiction was consistent with
his nationalist principles and the belief in a strong federal judiciary that was so
important to Adams and his father. In urging the court to retain jurisdiction, Adams
argued that "it is as much the duty of this court to exercise jurisdiction in cases where
it is given by the constitution and laws of the United States, as to refuse to assume
it where it is not given."' 13 0 Adams suggested that the Court in Bingham v. Cabot I
may have been "over scrupulous" because the jurisdiction of the federal courts
"was an object of jealousy" at the time that Bingham was decided and "there was,
probably a desire on the part of the court to remove all ground of suspicion, by
deciding doubtful cases against the jurisdiction. "'I Despite what Professor Herbert
A. Johnson has described as Adams's "able argument," 32 the Court in Boardman
ruled in favor of the defendant. In its one-paragraph decision, the Court explained
122 Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 59.
123 Id.
124 Adams explained, for example, that the infancy of any or even all of the members of a corporation would
not invalidate its acts and that the alienage of its members do not prevent it from holding lands. Id.





130 Id. at 59.
131 id. at 58. Adams observed that the effect of Bingham v. Cabot 11 had been "to exclude many cases upon
nice questions of pleading, which would otherwise have been clearly within the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States." Id.
132 G.L. HASKINS & H.A. JoHNsoN, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 616 (Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States No. 2, 1981).
19
Ross: John Quincy Adams
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
AKRON LAW REVIEW
that it was relying upon its recently announced decision in Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux,133 in which the Court had held that the citizenship of the individual
shareholders of the Bank of the United States should be considered in determining
whether complete diversity existed between the parties.
Marine insurance cases such as Boardman formed an important part of
Adams's practice and made up a substantial part of the docket of the Supreme Court
during its early years. 134 Five years prior to his argument in Boardman, Adams
obtained a favorable ruling in a leading insurance case, Head and Amory v. The
Providence Insurance Co., 35 which he argued before the Supreme Court in February
1804.136 In Head and Amory, the owner of merchandise that was aboard a Spanish
ship that had been captured by the British sued the insurer of the merchandise to
recover for the loss of the merchandise. The insurance company contended that it
had no liability under the policy because the insurance policy had been discharged
by an agreement into which the parties had entered before the insured learned of the
loss. After the trial court instructed the jury that the insurance company had proved
the existence of an agreement to cancel the policy, the jury had returned a verdict in
favor of the company. As counsel for the owner of the merchandise, Adams argued
that the evidence presented by the insurance company to demonstrate the existence
of the subsequent agreement was not valid because the agreement between the
parties was not in writing, the company had not executed the agreement in
accordance with the requirements of its charter and constitution, and the testimony
of the company's witness drew conclusions of law rather than conclusions of fact.'37
Further points were presented by a co-counsel for the plaintiffs. In an opinion in
support of the Supreme Court's decision to reverse the lower court's ruling and
remand the case for a new trial, Chief Justice John Marshall accepted Adams's
contention that the agreement was not valid because the insurance company had not
observed the proper corporate formalities since its charter required that its president
sign any binding agreement and its constitution further provided that its secretary
must counter-sign any such agreement."I The favorable decision came as a surprise
to Adams, who had predicted that the Court would "turn against us."13 9
In another marine insurance case that he argued before the Court early in 1804,
133 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
3 See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 132, at 454-92. Professor Johnson was observed that the development
of the law of marine insurance may have served as the nexus between modem rules of casualty insurance and
the law of business contracts. It also may have provided a substantial source of subsidiary case law in the
fields of trade regulation and prize jurisdiction. Id. at 454.
115 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804).
36 Adams received payment of two hundred dollars for his work on the Boardman case. APM, supra note
11, Reel 215 (entry for Feb. 7, 1804).
'3 Head & Amory, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 138-55.
I3 ld. at 166-69.
39 I MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 295 (C.F. Adams, ed. 1874). Although the Court remanded the case,
its opinion that none of the evidence to which the shipper objected was admissible led Adams to presume that
the corporation would not request another trial. APM, supra note 11, Reel 135 (J.Q. Adams to Rufus G.
Amory, February 25, 1804).
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Adams was less successful. In that case, Church v. Hubbart,140 the Court reversed
a judgment of the Circuit Court which had held that Adams's client, a cargo insurer,
was not liable under an insurance policy which relieved the insurer from liability for
losses caused by seizure by the Portuguese for illicit trade. The Supreme Court
agreed with the insurer on the merits of the case, holding that the Circuit Court
properly found that the terms of the insurance policy would exclude the underwriter
for liability if the vessel had been seized for illicit trade. The Court ruled, however,
that the insurer had failed to properly authenticate two Portuguese edicts concerning
illicit trade and the Portuguese judgment of sequestration of the vessel.141 Adams's
evident impatience with these technicalities was reflected in his remark to the Court
during oral argument that the plaintiff sought to defeat the defendant's ostensibly
"strong and unanswerable" defense under the language of the policy by demonstrat-
ing that the proof that supported the defense "was not clothed with that official
solemnity which could alone entitle it to credit, and that it wanted that most powerful
of all tests of truth -- a bit of sealing wax.'
' I4 2
It is noteworthy that Adams argued the Head and Amory and Church cases
while he was serving as a United States senator. Although Adams's age obviously
perceived no impropriety in this, Adams does not appear to have conducted any
significant legal practice during his six years in the Senate. Adams's primary legal
work seems to have been to act as a Washington agent for Massachusetts business-
men. Even in the Church case, Adams originally had intended to employ Luther
Martin to argue the defendant's case. In a letter to his client, Adams praised Martin's
"general professional eminence, as well as his particular familiarity with causes of
a commercial nature." 14 3 Since Martin was one of the outstanding advocates in the
early Republic and regularly appeared before the Supreme Court, Adams's prefer-
ence for Martin to argue the case does not necessarily imply any derogation by
Adams of his own legal talents. Indeed, Adams's decision, without consulting his
client, 144 to argue this important case himself with the assistance of John Thomson
Mason as co-counsel suggests that Adams had a higher opinion of his own legal
140 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
141 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall held that an unsworn certification by the American
consul at Lisbon did not provide proper authentication of the edicts. Id. at 236-38. Marshall likewise ruled
that a certificate of the judgment under the seal of the secretary of state of foreign affairs of Portugal, together
with the American counsel's certification of an English translation, did not constitute proper authentication
of the judgment. Id. at 238-39. Marshall explained that foreign judgments could be authenticated only by
1) an exemplification under the great seal; 2) a copy proved to be a true copy; or 3) a certificate which itself
is properly authenticated. Id. at 238.
42 Id. at 202. In a letter to his client following the Court's opinion, Adams explained that the Court's opinion
demonstrated that the plaintiff was bound eventually to lose the case on its merits if he chose to carry on the
contest. Adams stated that "I would recommend to the underwriters to be peculiarly cautious at their next
effort to get the papers in an unquestionable form." APM, supra note 11, Reel 135 (J.Q. Adams to Peter
Chardon Brooks, Mar. 6, 1804). In another letter three weeks later, Adams gave additional advice to Brooks
about the procedure for procuring proper authentication. id.
143 APM, supra note 11, Reel 135 (J.Q. Adams to Peter Chardon Brooks, Jan. 21, 1804). See also id. (J.Q.
Adams to Peter Chardon Brooks, Jan. 8, 1804).
'4 See APM, supra note 1!, Reel 135 (J.Q. Adams to Peter Chardon Brooks, Mar. 6, 1804).
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talents than he generally professed.
REJECTION OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT
Adams resumed his diplomatic career in 1809 when President Madison dis-
patched him to St. Petersburg as America's ambassador to Russia. While serving as
ambassador to Russia, Adams in February 1811 was nominated to serve on the
United States Supreme Court as the successor to William Cushing, who had died the
previous September. Like most Supreme Court nominations, the selection of Adams
was the product of a complex process. President Madison, in close consultation with
Thomas Jefferson, had hoped that the death of Cushing, an arch-Federalist who was
one of the original members of the Court, would afford an opportunity to place on
the Court a justice who would have the intelligence and courage to challenge
Marshall and propound sound republican doctrine.' 45 The first choice of Madison
and Jefferson had been Levi Lincoln, a distinguished Massachusetts lawyer whose
Republican credentials seemed impeccable.' 46 Although the Senate readily con-
firmed Madison's nomination of Lincoln, Lincoln refused the post. Madison then
turned to Alexander Wolcott, a collector of customs in Connecticut whose most
outstanding qualification for the post was his ardent Republicanism. After the
Senate rejected Wolcott by a wide margin, Madison nominated Adams, who was
confirmed by the Senate in a voice vote. Since Adams's Republican credentials were
far from unimpeachable, 147 Madison's selection of Adams seems to suggest that he
was seeking a candidate whose nomination would not create a political uproar or end
in another embarrassing defeat in the Senate. 48 Madison probably also had other
motives. He might have hoped that Adams's tenure on the Court would quicken his
growing Republicanism and thereby improve Republican prospects among Adams's
supporters in Massachusetts. 49 Even if Madison feared that Adams might not be
wholly converted to the Republican cause, Madison might have hoped that the
tenacious Adams would at least have the strength of character not to fall under the
spell of Marshall, as had other Republican appointees to the Court. Finally, Madison
might have intended to remove Adams as a possible challenger for the presidency
in 1812.150
The news of Adams's appointment to the Court took three months to reach
Adams in St. Petersburg. In a letter to Madison, Adams declined the appointment
on the ground that he would not be able to leave Russia for another year to take up
"' See Dowd, Justice Joseph Story and the Politics ofAppointment, 9 AM. J. L. HIST. 265, 266-68 (1965).
146 Id. at 270.
"' Adams had gradually shed the staunch Federalism of his early political career. As Professor Dowd pointed
out in discussing his nomination to the Court, Adams's record during the years 1808 to 1811 was checkered.
He had supported Jefferson's embargo and had attended the Republican convention that had nominated
Madison for the presidency. Dowd, supra note 145 at 276.
141 See Dowd, supra note 145, at 277, 284.
11 Id. at 276.
150 Id- at 277.
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his judicial duties inasmuch as his wife was pregnant and the long trip home would
be dangerous to a newborn child.' 5' Adams explained in his letter that he could not
expect the President to "keep an office of such importance vacant a full year longer
to await my return, and this consideration is decisive to induce me to decline the ap-
pointment." ' Adams went on, however, to explain to Madison that he did not
believe that judicial service fitted his interests or abilities. Although Adams
acknowledged that he had received an adequate legal education and that he had
practiced law during "several short periods in the course of my life," he told
Madison that "the great proportion of my time has been employed in occupations
so different from those of judicial tribunals, that I have long entertained a deep and
serious distrust of my qualifications for a seat on the bench." ' 53 Adams strongly
urged Madison to appoint in his place John Davis, the federal district court judge in
Massachusetts who had appointed Adams as Commissioner in Bankruptcy. 54 Madi-
son does not appear to have given any serious consideration to Davis, and he
nominated instead Joseph Story, who was most pleased to take his place on the Court
after the Senate speedily confirmed his nomination.
In a letter to his father, Adams reiterated his refusal to permit the President to
leave the seat vacant for a year "merely to suit my private convenience,'' 5 5 his
reluctance to take a seat for which he believed that Davis was better qualified, 156 and
''my own sense of my own unfitness for a seat in judicial tribunals." But after
John Adams wrote to his son to urge him to reconsider his decision because the
judicial post would secure his return home and shelter him from the vortex of politics,
'5' IV WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 94 (J.Q. Adams to James Madison, June 3, 1811). It is ironic that the child
died before Adams returned to the United States.
152 Id.
"I Id. at 95. Similarly, Adams had explained two months earlier in his letter to Thomas Boylston Adams
that" I am conscious of too little law even for practice at the bar, still less should I feel myself qualified for
the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 47-48 (Apr. 10, 1811).
154 Id. at 95-96 (J.Q: Adams to James Madison, June 3, 1811). Aside from being an old friend of the Adams
family, a strong Federalist and an appointee of John Adams, Davis had won John Quincy Adams's
approbation by having the courage to uphold the constitutionality of the Embargo Act of 1807 even though
many Federalists and the New England mercantile interests vehemently opposed the Act. In an opinion
issued on October 8, 1808, Davis had enunciated a broad vision of Congress's discretion under the commerce
power. See United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). In a letter two months
after the decision, Adams had told William Branch Giles that" [y]ou have not heard what means were used
and by whom to bias that decision, nor how much disappointment has followed from that honest firmness
and incorruptible integrity of our districtjudge. " III WtrITcs, supra note 7, at 264 (Dec. 10, 1808). Adams
declared that efforts to sway Davis's judgment would have succeeded "had not his good sense and his spirit
been superior to every consideration of party management." Id. Similarly, in his letter to Madison, Adams
declared that Davis, "on one signal and not untrying occasion, manifested at once the steadiness of his mind,
his inflexible adherence to the law, his independence of party prejudices and control, and his determination
to support at the post allotted to him the administration of government in all constitutional measures." IV
id. at 96 (J.Q. Adams to James Madison, June 3, 1811). In a letter to his brother Thomas Boylston Adams
after learning about Cushing's death but before hearing of his appointment, Adams declared that his
occupation of a Supreme court seat to the exclusion of Davis would be "an atrocious usurpation." Id. at 48
(Apr. 10, 1811).
"I Id. at 101 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, June 7, 1811).
156 Id. at 99.
157 Id.
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Adams presented blunter reasons for his refusal of the post. Far from removing him
from politics, Adams contended that even if "my own passions would allow me to
stand aloof from all politics, as much as every judge ought to, the passions of others
would involve me in them. If my heart is sufficiently impartial towards all of my
countrymen to make me a proper umpire in their controversies, their hearts are not
impartial enough to make them fit to be judged by me." 15 8 Adams also reluctantly
revealed that he was "deeply dissatisfied with what is called the administration of
justice, both in our state and federal courts." 15 9 Adams explained that he believed
that courts in the majority of cases sacrificed justice to "mere forms or to general
rules" and that he entertained "some very heretical opinions upon the merits of that
common law, so idolized by all of the English common lawyers and by all the parrots
who repeat their words in America." 60 Since he had adopted these views only after
careful consideration, he could not easily eradicate their deep roots from his mind.
Moreover, the hostile public response to some of his public expressions of these
views had warned him "to be extremely cautious in future how I mingled such edged
tools as those in the political controversies of the times.""'6 Adams concluded that
"I have not weight and influence enough in my country to bring it over to my
opinions, and I have too much independence of spirit to renounce them myself. In
any other than a judicial station I have no call to discuss them. There a sense of my
duty would often compel me to bring them out, and if I did, you may be assured that
neither my life nor the good people of America would be tranquilized by it." 1
62
Adams's antipathy toward the common law was shared by many Americans
of his generation. Although the colonists had invoked the common law as a defense
against the tyranny of Parliament and the Crown, 63 the common law fell into
disfavor during the reaction against British institutions that followed the Revolution.
This hostility was most pronounced in frontier areas and among Anti-Federalists and
their political descendants, the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians. Attempts to reject the
common law during this period ranged from rejection of English precedent to advo-
cacy of the adoption of civil codes."6 It is somewhat surprising that Adams, a late
and tepid convert to Republicanism, would have joined the more ardent Republicans
in derogating the common law. Unlike many of his fellow Republicans, Adams was
an inveterate anglophile and he remained immune to the francophilia that character-
ized so many Republicans who professed to admire the French civil code. Nor did
151 Id. at 145 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, July 21, 1811). Similarly, in his letter to Thomas Boylston Adams
prior to learning of his appointment, Adams had explained that "I am... and always shall be, too much of
a political partisan for a judge; and although I know as well as any man in America how and when to lay the
partisan aside, I do not wish to be called so often and so completely to do it, as my own sense of duty would
call me, were I seated upon the bench." Id. at 48 (Apr. 10, 1811).
"I9 Id. at 145 (J.Q. Adams to John Adams, July 21, 1811).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 146.
162 Id.
163 See e.g., L.M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1973).
"6 See II CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 20, at 51-73; Chroust, Dilemma, supra
note 20, at 65-69.
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Adams share the intense egalitarianism that underlay much of the hostility toward
the common law among Republicans, who bitterly complained that the arcane
complexities of the common law enabled lawyers to take advantage of the common
man. As the son of a distinguished common-law lawyer who had appealed to the
common law in defense of the rights of the American colonists, Adams might
particularly have been expected to respect the common law.
Adams's doubts about the common law may be explained in part by his cos-
mopolitanism; certainly his extensive travels in Europe and his wide reading had
exposed him to the merits of civil law. Adams's attitude may also be traced to the
frustrations that he experienced as a student and practitioner of the common law and
perhaps also to the doubts that he not altogether disingenuously professed to have
about his abilities as a lawyer. Whatever the reasons for Adams's skepticism about
the common law, Adams did not belong to the classes of Americans who were most
antagonistic toward the common law during the decades following the Revolution.
Adams's doubts about the common law suggest that antipathy toward the common
law was more widespread during the early nineteenth century than generally has
been supposed. The common law system in America may have been preserved more
from the inertia of men such as Adams who refrained from joining the ranks of active
opponents of the common law than because the common law enjoyed broad and
positive support.
ADAMS THE LAWYER-PRESIDENT
Adams's refusal of a seat on the Supreme Court insured that he would remain
in the" vortex of politics." There is no doubt that this suited his tastes and ambitions.
Ralph Waldo Emerson may not have greatly exagerrated his point when he observed
that Adams -- for all of his erudition -- was a "bruiser" who loved political
combat. 65 Following the termination of his service in Russia in 1814, Adams served
as commissioner to the peace conference in Ghent in 1814, as minister to the Court
of St. James from 1815 to 1817, as James Monroe's secretary of state from 1817 to
1825, and as president from 1825 to 1829.
In attempting to assess the impact of Adams's legal career on his presidency,
it is useful to consider William Howard Taft's observation that
It is of great advantage to a President to be a lawyer -- at least that was
my experience. Of course he can not look up questions of law himself
while he is in the office, save in a very exceptional case, and he has to
depend on his Attorney General and his other advisors, but being a
lawyer he is able to weigh the advice more certainly than one who hasn't
had that professional experience. In the matter of appointments, the
165 S.F. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION 195 (1956) (quoting VI JOURNALS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 349-50 (E.W. Emerson & W.E. Forbes eds. 1911).
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most critical duty the President has to perform is the selection of Federal
Judges, and in this respect he has a great advantage in resisting the
political pressure often brought to bear upon him to appoint very indif-
ferent or objectionable men to the Bench.'6 6
Although Taft's remarks seem cogent, the degree to which legal training will
affect a President's performance in the White Houses obviously is a function of the
incumbent's own peculiar experiences the law and the unique circumstances of his
tenure. Moreover, the multiplicity of independent variables that affect any Presi-
dent's behavior in office obscures -- perhaps beyond recognition -- any traits that
might be attributed to legal training. Perhaps this accounts for the paucity of
scholarly commentary on the legal careers of the twenty-six presidents who have
been formally trained in the law.
It is particularly difficult and perhaps futile to attempt to assess the impact of
Adams's legal career upon his presidency. In all probability, however, the impact
was small. Unlike presidents such as Abraham Lincoln, whose legal career yielded
technical skills, professional experience and social connections that provided the
basis for a political career, Adams's political career was not dependent upon his
activities as a lawyer. Adams's legal career seems to have provided him with few
technical skills, professional experiences, social contacts, or traits of character that
helped him to win the presidency or significantly influenced his conduct in office.
Adams's familiarity with legal terminology and concepts obviously must have been
useful to him, but his experiences as a diplomat, legislator and Secretary of State
clearly provided far richer and more relevant technical preparation for his presiden-
tial duties. Similarly, the many social connections that Adams acquired through his
family background and his pre-presidential political career were far more important
to him than any that he acquired through his law practice. Likewise, Adams's
remarkable powers of self-discipline seem to have been forged more by the rigors
of his early education than by his legal studies or practice. Although the legal studies
that Adams often found distasteful may have honed his extraordinary powers of self-
discipline, the rigors of Adams's education prior to his apprenticeship with Parsons
had already had shaped his character. Indeed, Adams's experiences at the law can
perhaps best be defined in negative rather than positive terms. His frustrating life as
a law student and lawyer seem to have made him suspicious and disdainful of the
law's proclivity for technicalities and delay. Nevertheless, Adams himself appar-
ently believed that a legal education, supplemented by a broad liberal education,
provided the best training for a public career, for he arranged for all three of his sons
to study law as part of their grooming to continue the Adams political dynasty.
167
11 William Howard Taft to Alfred C. Meyer, January 28, 1924, Papers of William Howard Taft, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Series 3, Reel 260.
167 BEMIs, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION, supra note 165, at 95. Professor Bemis also pointed out that
Adams believed that legal training would "provide some private competence for protection against the
suffrage of a fickle public." Id.
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And even though Adams's education was primarily forged through the non-legal
reading in which he immersed himself throughout his life, his legal training must
have provided him with important technical skills that made him a more effective
public official. In discussing Adams's crusade against slavery during his years in the
House of Representatives, for example, Professor Bemis remarked that "[n]obody
could be more resourceful than Adams in finding technicalities within the lex
parliamentaria to make an unwilling majority -- and the country behind him -- listen
to him."' 68 Adams's legal training also must have served him particularly well in
such other activities as the negotiations for the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 and his
participation in the Senate trials of Judge John Pickering in 1803 and Judge Samuel
Chase in 1804.
Since Adams's legal career had relatively little impact upon his intellectual
and social development, it is difficult to try to use Adams's legal career as a basis for
generalizations about the impact of legal training upon presidential performance.
Indeed, such generalizations would be tenuous at best under any circumstances. The
difficulty of making such generalizations is illustrated by one of the few studies of
the relationship between legal training and presidential performance. 69 That study,
by Professors Thomas M. Green and William D. Pederson, has pointed out that a dis-
proportionately large number of what James Barber has termed "active-negative"
presidents were lawyers. Of the nine presidents, including John Quincy Adams,
whom the study of lawyer-presidents has assigned to that group, seventy-eight
percent, or all but two, were lawyers. 7 ° In contrast, only forty percent of the ten
"active positive" presidents were lawyers. Fifty percent of the four "passive-
negative" presidents were lawyers and seventy-one percent of the fourteen "passive
positive" presidents were lawyers.'17 Professors Green and Pederson have pointed
161 Id. at 338.
169 Green & Pederson, The Behavior of Lawyer-Presidents: A 'Barberian' Link, 15 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES
Q. 343, 346 (1985). Professor Barber's typology is presented in J.D. BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER:
PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1972).
170 Professor Barber has defined the "active-negative" president as one who expends intense efforts in his
duties but reaps few emotional rewards. Barber also has found that "active-negative presidents" also are
characterized by "a perfectionist conscience." Id. Many of the "active-negative" presidents, such as John
Quincy Adams, Herbert Hoover, Woodrow Wilson and Lyndon Baines Johnson, also have exhibited a rigid
inflexibility that has impeded them from accomplishing the principal goals of their presidencies. In addition
to John Quincy Adams, the lawyers that Green and Pederson assign to the group are Andrew Jackson,
Woodrow Wilson, James Knox Polk, John Adams, Grover Cleveland, and Richard Nixon. The two non-
lawyers are Lyndon Johnson, who briefly attended law school at Georgetown, and Andrew Johnson.
Adams's career at the bar is strikingly similar in many respects to that of Woodrow Wilson. Like
Adams, Wilson initially professed to enjoy his legal studies but found the law to be increasingly frustrating.
Wilson, like Adams, abandoned his formal study of law and continued his legal studies at home after suffering
a nervous breakdown. Wilson practiced law only for one year, a period during which he had few clients,
diverted his attention to literary interests, and received necessary financial assistance from his parents.
Throughout his career at the bar, Wilson aspired to a literary or political career and abandoned his law practice
to pursue graduate studies in political science. See H.W. WILKINSON,WOODROW WILSON: THE ACADEMIC
YEARS (1967); G.S. OSBORN, WOODROW WILSON: THE EARLY YEARS (1968). It is interesting to note that both
presidents ended their terms in office in frustration after Congress rejected idealistic proposals.
"I' Green & Pederson, supra note 169, at 345. Professor Barber has defined "active positive" presidents
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out that the "active negative" lawyer-presidents tend to have applied themselves
intensely to the law but that they tend not to have been career lawyers. 72 John Quincy
Adams obviously fits this description.
While the pioneering study of Professors Green and Pederson is provocative,
it does not adequately support their conclusion that "good lawyers generally make
lousy presidents and poor civil libertarians." 17 3 Their study involves so few persons
and so many different historical periods and independent variables that it provides
little basis for evaluating the impact of legal training upon conduct in office. There
are many reasons other than legal training, for example, why many of the least
successful presidents have been lawyers.174 Similarly, the stained civil liberties
records of such lawyer-presidents as Lincoln, Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt should
be attributed much more to the simple fact that they served during wartime than to
the fact that they were lawyers.
Despite the difficulty of drawing any correlation between legal training and
presidential success, it may be plausible to suggest (as Professors Green and Ped-
ersen seem to do) that a legalistic mentality may impede the creativity and flexibility
of a president. Professor Thomas A. Bailey, for example, suggested that constitu-
tional lawyers have been ineffective presidents because" [s]uch men, brought up to
revere the law and to study the Constitution through the lenses of the states' rights
Founding Fathers, have tended to recoil from resolute action" that might impinge
upon the Constitution and upset the delicate balance of powers.'75
Even if legal training can dim political vision, John Quincy Adams is not an
example of the perils of legal training. As President, Adams propounded an
ambitious program of national improvements that failed in part because it contra-
vened accepted notions of what constituted the proper constitutional bounds of
federal power. 176 As we shall see below in Section VII, Adams's later career in the
House of Representatives was characterized by a similar boldness of vision.
as flexible persons who are successful in relating to their environment. Active-positive presidents, such as
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, are creative and energetic chief executives. He defines "passive
positive" presidents as those, such as William Howard Taft and Warren Harding, who are receptive and
compliant. "Passive negative" presidents are defined by Barber as those who enter public service out of a
sense of duty, and take refuge from "the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles
(especially prohibitions) and procedural arrangements." Professor Barber places Dwight Eisenhower and
Calvin Coolidge in this category. Id. at 344-45.
I72 ld. at 348-49.
1I Id. at 350.
14 Forexample, Presidents Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan were lawyers whose presidencies generally have
been rated as unsuccessful. Although one might argue that their legal training impeded their ability to deal
creatively and flexibly with the sectional crisis that plagued their presidencies, it is highly questionable
whether any non-lawyers could have successfully found solutions to the seemingly intractible disputes
between North and South. Fillmore's legal training may have helped him to ameliorate the sectional crisis
in 1850, when Fillmore played an important role in designing the legislation that became known as the
Compromise of 1850.
115 T.A. BAILEY, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 234 (1966).
'176 See BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION, supra note 165, at 60-70.
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Disregarding the delicate legal forms and constitutional balance that had kept
sectional controversies under control, Adams emerged during his post-presidential
career as the principal congressional advocate of abolitionism. Similarly, Adams's
views on constitutional issues (discussed below in Section VIII) and his defense of
the Amistad captives (discussed below in Section IX) were characterized by a scorn
for narrow legalism and were infused with a belief in broad human freedom. In all
of these situations, however, we may detect both positive and negative influences of
Adams's legal training. Adams's frustrating months in Parsons's office and his
boring years at the Boston bar may have accentuated his impatience with the more
stultifying aspects of legalism. At the same time, as we have seen, Adams's legal
training provided him with technical skills and broad learning that no doubt proved
useful to him during his tenure as President and member of the House of Represen-
tatives.
Adams's legal background also may have proved to be of some use in his
selection of federal judges. Adams made two nominations to the Supreme Court.
His first nominee, Robert Trimble of Kentucky, was confirmed by the Senate but
died after serving on the Court for only two years. Adams nominated another
Kentuckian, John J. Crittenden, to succeed Trimble. Since Adams nominated
Crittenden following his defeat by Andrew Jackson at a time when he faced a hostile
Senate, Crittenden's nomination was doomed from the start. The Senate delivered
the coup de grace to the nomination when it postponed action on February 12, 1829.
Adams's nomination of Trimble was based upon the usual mix of considera-
tions involving narrow political expediency, competency, geography and judicial
philosophy. Trimble was politically attractive because he was a resident of the state
of Kentucky, a state then at the height of its national prominence. The death of
Trimble's predessessor, Justice Thomas Todd, another Kentuckian, had left-both
Kentucky and the Southwest "unrepresented" on the Court. Although Tennessee,
the other populous Southwestern state, may have had an abundance of legal talent,
there was no political profit in nominating anyone from Andrew Jackson's home
state. Kentucky, on the other hand, was politically significant to the Adams
Administration. It also was legally significant to the Supreme Court because of the
number of contested land claims from Kentucky that reached the Supreme Court.'77
Trimble was philosophically attractive to Adams because Trimble, during his nine
years as a federal district judge prior to his elevation to the Court, appears to been
a staunch defender of federal supremacy at a time when federal powers were under
fierce attack from states' rights advocates in Kentucky. 178 During his brief tenure on
the Court, Trimble continued to defend federal power, agreeing with Chief Justice
John Marshall in nearly every case. 17 9 Although Trimble parted company with
'1 See G.E. WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-35, at 303 (Volumes III and IV of
the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States) (1988).
178 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 515-16 (L. Friedman & F. Israel, ed.
1969).
179 Id. at 516.
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Marshall to uphold a state bankruptcy law in Ogden v. Saunders'8 ° and wrote an
opinion for an apparently unanimous Court in the final Antelope Case'8 ' that upheld
a decree that had the effect of requiring some of the Africans who were captured from
the Spanish slave ship "Antelope" to remain in slavery, Trimble's record does not
appear to have given Adams any cause for major disappointment. 8 2 G. Edward
White has concluded that Trimble's record on the Court presents "a tantalizing
example of a potentially distinguished judicial career cut short before it could be
fully assessed." According to White, Trimble "might have become one of the
leading judges on the late Marshall Court and a strong supporter of jurisprudential
orthodoxy."' 83
ADAMS As LEGAL PHILOSOPHER
Although Adams faced financial difficulties after his retirement from the
presidency 184 he does not appear to have considered the possibility of practicing law.
Instead, Adams in 1830 chose the far less lucrative option of seeking a seat in the
United States House of Representatives. Elected to nine terms, Adams served in the
house from 1830 until his death in 1848. As a congressman, Adams became an
outspoken opponent of slavery.185
Although Adams's role in the difficult constitutional issues that vexed the
nation during this period of sectional controversy were primarily political rather than
intellectual, two discourses by Adams made not insignificant contributions to
constitutional theory. In an oration delivered at Quincy on July 4, 1831, at the height
of the nullification controversy, Adams argued that the concept of the Union was
interwoven into the most fundamental fabric of the American polity inasmuch as the
Declaration of Independence itself established a union. In support of this position,
Adams pointed out that the Declaration of Independence referred to a" United States
of America" and the "United Colonies," named no individual state, and that the
delegates signed the Declaration not as representatives of any state but as represen-
tatives of the entire nation. Adams declared that" [t]he Declaration of Independence
was a social compact, by which the whole people covenanted with each citizen of the
United Colonies, and each citizen with the whole people, that the United Colonies
were, and of right ought to be, free and independent states. To this compact, union
80 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
The Antelope Case, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546 (1827).
182 Trimble's opinion in Ogden should not be regarded as any apostasy from his belief in broad federal power.
Although Marshall and Story dissented in Ogden, the Court's ruling did not represent any derogation of
federal power. Moreover, the decision helped facilitate the very sort of national commercial growth that
Adams -- and Marshall and Story -- championed. Likewise, although Trimble himself was a slaveholder, his
opinion in the Antelope decision did not significantly strengthen the foundations of the peculiar institution
that Adams so detested.
83 WHITE, supra note 177, at 302-03.
8 BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION, supra note 165, at 197-200; L.L. RICHARDS, THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 20-22 (1986).
"I See generally, RICHARDS, supra note 184.
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was as vital as freedom or independence." Adams contended that the "hallucina-
tion" of state sovereignty emerged only later among proponents of states' rights.
According to Adams, no free person would submit to the sort of absolute and
unlimited state power comprehended by the word "sovereign." He traced the
existence of an American doctrine of sovereignty to the baneful influence of
Blackstone, who had contended that Parliament possessed sovereignty. Adams's
ideas may be traced in part to the influence of Nathan Dane, whose writings on the
Union had been sent to Adams by Story.'86 Dane had written in opposition to the
doctrine of nullification in his Appendix to the ninth volume of his General
Abridgement and Digest of American Law.'87 In his Appendix, Dane set forth the
ideas that the theory of a united American people preceded the Constitution and
could be traced to the establishment of the Continental Congress in 1775 and the
Declaration of Independence in 1776. While Adams's ideas may not have been
wholly original, his espousal of them helped to widen their currency. Within a short
time, Adams's oration had been published in a pamphlet that was distributed
throughout the nation. 88 John Marshall wrote to Adams to commend his ideas and
to state that he had never before heard the suggestion that "the Declaration of
Independence was also a declaration of a previously-existing union." 89
Adams espoused many of the same views eight years later in an oration
delivered in New York on the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the federal
government. 190 Adams stated that Declaration of Independence had proclaimed the
inhabitants of the States to be "one people," living under a government instituted
"under the solemn mutual pledges of perpetual union. "'91 Adams argued that the
Articles of Confederation had betrayed the ideals of the Declaration by substituting
the doctrine of state sovereignty for the rights of the people in a national union. 92
Recounting in detail the shortcomings and failures of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, 19 3 Adams declared that the work of the revolution was "but half done'
' I94
186 BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION, supra note 165, at 231.
187 For a discussion concerning the views of Dane and other nineteenth century scholars on sovereignty, see
E.K. BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1965).
88 VIII MEMOIRS, supra note 139, at 388.
189 BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION, supra note 165, at 236.
t90 J.Q. ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION. A DISCOURSE DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE NEW YORK
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK ON TUESDAY, THE 30TH OF APRIL 1839 (1848).
19' Id. at 9. (emphasis in original).
192 Id. at 30-36. According to Adams, "[t]here was thus no congeniality of principle between the Declaration
of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. The foundation of the former were a superintending
Providence -- the rights of man, and the constituent revolutionary power of the people. That of the latter was
the sovereignty of organized power, and the independence of the separate or dis-united States. The fabric
of the Declaration and that of the Confederation. were each consistent with its own foundation, but they could
not form one consistent symmetrical edifice. They were the productions of different minds and of adverse
passions -- one, ascending for the foundation of human government to the laws of nature and of God, written
upon the heart of man -- the other, resting upon the basis of human institutions, and prescriptive law and
colonial charters. Thecomerstoneoftheonewas right -- that of the other was power.'" Id. at 17. (emphasis
in original).
193 Id. at 11-36.
'94 Id. at 17.
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between the promulgation of the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of
the Constitution and that "the constituent power of the people had never been called
into action." During that time, "[a] confederacy had been substituted in the place
of a government; and state sovereignty had usurped the constituent sovereignty of
the people."' 195 Adams contended that the revolution was therefore the work of
thirteen years and "had never been completed" until the federation government
began to operate under the Constitution. 196 Adams declared that" [t]he Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, are parts of one consistent
whole, founded upon one and the same theory of government, then new, not as a
theory, for it had been working itself into the mind of man for many ages, and been
especially expounded in the writings of Locke, but.., never before.., adopted by
a great nation in practice." 197 Adams denounced the doctrine of state sovereignty as
"anti-revolutionary" and a denial of belief in natural equality, the inalienable rights
of man, and the idea that the people are the only legitimate source of power. 198 Adams
contended, however, that the nation's leaders had remained true to the principles of
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and that adherence to those
principles had secured for the nation prosperity, military security, justice and
personal liberty. 99
ADAMS AND THE AMiSTAD CASE
At the age of seventy-three, Adams returned to the bar for one last time for
what was one of the most significant and personally satisfying chapters in his legal
career -- his successful representation of thirty-nine Africans who sought freedom
from Spanish slave traders. The Africans, most of whom had recently been captured
on the west coast of Africa, had mutinied on the slave ship Amistad in 1839 during
a voyage between ports in Cuba, where Spanish law permitted slavery but prohibited
the importation of slaves.200 The Africans slew the captain of the ship, held two
surviving Spaniards as captives, and ordered their captives to sail to Africa. The
Spaniards, however, had managed to secretly steer the vessel toward the United
States and the small schooner anchored near Montauk, Long Island in August. Cap-
tured several days later by a U.S. naval vessel, the Africans were taken to Connecti-
19' Id. at 38-39.
196 Id. at 40.
"I7 Id. at 40-41.
'9g Id. at 41. Adams contended that" [tihe grossly immoral and dishonest doctrine of despotic state soveignty,
the exclusive judge of its own obligations, and responsible to no power on earth or in heaven, for the violation
of them" is not found in the Declaration of Independence or in the Constitution. Id.
"9 Id. at 118. Adams could not resist attacking the republicans who had opposed the presidential policies
of Washington and the elder Adams. Id. at 85-114, passim. Adams particularly disparaged the naivete of
Americans who had confused the spurious freedom professed by revolutionary France with the genuine
freedom embodied in the principles of the Declaration of Independence, id. at 85-95, and even cast upon
himself once more the mantle of Marcellus to excoriate the activities of Genet. Id. at 93-94; see notes 77 and
78, supra, and accompanying text. Adams acknowledged, however, that the republicans had not undone the
work of his father and Washington after they came to power in 1801. Id. at 114-15.
2 For a thorough discussion of the case, see H. JONES, MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD: THE SAGA OF A SLAVE
REVOLT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN ABOLITION, LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1987).
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cut and jailed. The case immediately became a cause celebre in which battle lines
were drawn between abolitionists who wanted to return the mutineers to Africa and
the pro-slavery Van Buren Administration, which contended that the Africans were
slaves who should be returned to Cuba. The outraged protests of the Spanish gov-
ernment infused the case with international significance. The United States District
Court in January 1840 ruled that only one of the Africans, a boy who long had resided
in Cuba, was a slave and must be returned to Spanish authorities. The Court held that
the other Africans were free men who had been illegally kidnapped and must be
returned to Africa. In April, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision.
Fearful of losing Southern political support, the Van Buren Administration appealed
the case to the United States Supreme Court.
A few months before the case came before the Court, the abolitionist defense
committee attempted to find an attorney of national eminence and political stature
to plead the case before the nation's highest tribunal. Adams, who had given legal
assistance to the defense at earlier stages of the case, seemed like the ideal choice.
As a member of the House of Representatives, Adams had distinguished himself as
one of the most outspoken and tenacious opponents of slavery. For the past four
years, Adams had fought the House's "gag rule," by which proponents of slavery
attempted to suppress the controversy over slavery by prohibiting any debate or other
action on any petition, memorial or resolution concerning slavery. Dubbed "Old
Man Eloquent" for his persistent and ringing attacks on the gag, his clever attempts
to evade it, and his unremitting congressional remarks on the taboo subject of
slavery, Adams finally secured the repeal of the gag in 1844.201 Despite his hatred
of slavery and his support for the abolitionist cause in the Amistad case, Adams was
reluctant to involve himself further in the case. In response to entreaties by the
defense committee, Adams protested that he was too old and long removed from the
active practice of law. After finally deciding that he could not flinch from what he
viewed as a moral duty, Adams immersed himself in the case and refused to accept
fees for his services. Although the abolitionist Roger S. Baldwin provided Adams
with a complete brief, Adams studied lawbooks, consulted with defense attorneys,
visited the Africans, unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Attorney General Henry
D. Gilpin to dismiss the case, and studied two copious scrapbooks of clippings on the
case.
202
Argument before the court commenced on February 22, 1841, when Gilpin
presented the government's position, arguing that international law required the
United States to return the Africans to Spanish authorities inasmuch as the Spanish-
American treaty of 1795 provided for the delivery of one nation's property upon
presentation of proper proof of ownership. Gilpin was followed by Baldwin, who
spent the remainder of the first day and part of the next day pleading the case for the
Africans before Adams spoke. Baldwin argued that the United States could not give
20' RICHARDS, supra note 184, at 175-79.
202 See JONES, supra note 200.
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extra-territorial force to a foreign slave law and that the Spaniards had failed to
produce proper evidence in support of their claims. On the third day, Adams
continued the defense's argument, making his first appearance before the Court
since he argued the Fletcher case in 1809. The circumstances were most inauspi-
cious. Burdened by his duties in the House and irritated by the ordinary infirmities
of a man of his years, Adams felt that he had failed to devote adequate time for
preparations. On the very eve of the day for which oral argument was scheduled,
Adams was sorely shaken when his coachman died from injuries suffered a day
earlier in a carriage accident shortly after he had dropped Adams off at the Capitol,
where the Supreme Court then met.2°3 Chief Justice Taney granted Adams's request
for a two-day adjournment, but this hardly gave Adams time to regain his equanim-
ity. On the evening before arguments commenced, Adams recorded in his diary that
he meditated on the "mysterious, cheering and awful" dispensation of angels until
"my impending duties brought me down again to the earth.' ,2' Late in the day, he
had yet to prepare a frame for his argument, and he observed that" [o]f all that I have
written, nine-tenths are waste paper." 20 5 The next morning, Adams walked to the
Capitol in what he called "a thoroughly bewildered mind--so bewildered as to leave
me nothing but fervent prayer that presence of mind may not utterly fail me at the
trial I am about to go through." 26 On the second day, as Baldwin continued his
argument, Adams suffered from what he described as "increasing agitation of mind,
now little short of agony" since he had yet failed to assemble "[t]he very skeleton"
of his argument.
Although Adams's distress and agitation continued into the third day of the
proceedings, he immediately achieved equanimity when he finally rose to speak.
Adams observed accurately that the structure of his argument was concentrated upon
"the steady and undeviating pursuit of one fundamental principle, the ministration
of justice." Appealing to the principles of natural law expressed in the Declaration
of Independence, Adams stated that "I know of no other law that reaches the case
of my clients, but the law of Nature and of Nature's God on which our Fathers placed
our own national existence." 2 7 In making this argument, Adams alleged that the
Van Buren administration had improperly interfered in the case and had connived
with the Spanish authorities to deprive the captives of their right to freedom.20 8 In
attempting to demonstrate a clear pattern of executive interference, Adams first
quoted a letter that Secretary of State John Forsyth early in the case had written to
203 X MEMOIRS, supra note 139, at 425-27.
204 Id. at 428-29.
205 Id. at 429.
206 Id.
207 J.Q. ADAMS, ARGUMENT OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE
CASE OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, VS. CINQUE, AND OTHERS, AFRICANS, CAPTURED IN THE SCHOONER
AMISTAD 9 (1841) [hereinafter ARGUMENT]. (emphasis in text).
20 See, e.g., id. at 5-6. Adams charged that the Van Buren administration in all of its proceedings had evinced
"[s]ympathy with the white, antipathy to the black." Id. at 6. Adams presented his arguments only one week
before the expiration of the term of Van Buren, whose Democratic Party had been defeated in the election
of the previous November.
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the Spanish ambassador that stated that the Administration and the courts assumed
that the claimants "alone were the parties aggrieved; and that their claims to the
surrender of the property was founded in fact and in justice.' '209 Adams quoted
another letter from Forsyth to the District Attorney of Connecticut, in which Forsyth
told the District Attorney to "take care that no proceeding of your Circuit Court, or
of any other judicial tribunal, places the vessel, cargo, or slaves beyond the control
of the Federal Executive.' '210
Adams also contended that correspondence between Spanish ambassadors
and Forsyth demonstrated that Forsyth had attempted to assure the ambassador that
the executive branch would work to assure the return of the Africans. Adams first
read a letter from the Spanish ambassador Calderon to Forsyth in which Calderon
demanded that the vessel should be set at liberty and the captives sent to be tried by
the proper tribunal for violation of Spanish laws, and that it be declared that no
judicial tribunal in the United States had the power to institute proceedings against
subjects of Spain for crimes committed on board a Spanish vessel or in Spanish
waters.21 In an echo of his castigation of Genet, Adams was outraged by Calderon's
disregard for America's constitutional separation of powers, as expressed in
Calderon's stated presumption that the President already had already stayed the
proceedings of the court.212 Adams was equally outraged that Forsyth had not
immediately and emphatically rejected Calderon's demands.2 3 Adams contended
that Forsyth "has degraded the country, in the face of the whole civilized world, but
only by allowing these demands to remain unanswered, but by proceeding ...
throughout the whole transaction, as if the Executive were earnestly desirous to
comply with every one of the demands." 2 4 Adams further cited a letter from Forsyth
209 id.
210 Id. at 12-13.
211 Id. at 13-16.
212 Id. at 14-15.
213 Adams stated that "the Secretary ought to have shown Mr. Calderon, that the demand for a proclamation
by the President of the United States, against the jurisdiction of the courts, was not only inadmissible but
offensive -- it was demanding what the Executive could not do, by the constitution... it would violate the
principles of our government generally and in every particular; it would be against the rights of the negroes,
of the citizens, and of the States." Id. at 29. Adams argued that the claim that the captives should be delivered
was equally inadmissible since the President has no power to arrest either citizens or foreigners and the
Secretary also should have repudiated the ambassador's suggestion that the captives should be returned to
Cuba. According to Adams, "[t]he Secretary should have called upon the Spanish ambassador to name an
instance where such a demand has been made by any government of another government that was
independent. He should have told him, that such a demand was treating the President... not as the head of
a nation, but as a constabler, a catchpole." Id. at 29-30. Adams also stated that Forsyth ought to have
corrected the ambassador's mistaken assumption that the case was pending before a court of the state of
Connecticut rather than a federal court. Id. at 30.
214 Id. In particular, Adams faulted Forsyth for asking the Spanish ambassador to forward documents to him,
contending that "it was no part of the business of the American Secretary of State to look after the evidence."
Id. at 31-32. Adams later complained that Forsyth "had suffered both Mr. Calderon and his successor to
remain under the impression that if theirdemands were not complied with, for the kidnapping of these people
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to the Chevalier d'Argaiz, Calderon's successor, in which Forsyth indicated that the
government had instructed the United States District Attorney for New York to offer
advice and assistance to the two Spaniards who claimed to own the Africans, who
had been arrested in New York and were being sued in an action pending in a New
York court.215 Again, Adams faulted the Secretary of State for failing to answer a
later letter from d'Argaiz in which the ambassador had urged the government to
return byfiat the Africans to Cuba.2 16 Accusing Forsyth and the Spanish ministers
of "conspiracies" against the Africans, Adams also cited a note from Forsyth to the
Secretary of the Navy dated January 7, 1840 in which Forsyth had acknowledged
that a federal ship was under orders to return the Africans to Cuba as soon as the
Connecticut federal court rendered its expected decision in favor of the Spanish and
later had instructed the district attorney in Connecticut to place the Africans on board
ship without waiting for an appeal. Adams also pointed out that the Connecticut
district attorney early in the proceedings had invited instructions from Forsyth.
Adams lamented in his diary that he had analyzed the correspondence between
Forsyth and the Spanish ministers "with critical research as far as I was able, but with
not half the acuteness, nor with a tenth part the vigor" that he could have mustered
if he had enjoyed access to all documents.
Adams spoke for four and a half hours on the first day of his presentation to
the Court. Although Adams noted in his diary that "I did not, I could not, answer
public expectation," he consoled himself that he had "not yet utterly failed." 217
After a restless night of little sleep, Adams nevertheless awoke "with much
encouraged and cheerful feelings. ' 218 Upon arriving at the Capitol, however,
Adams learned that the day's proceedings would be adjouft ned for several days
because Justice Philip P. Barbour had been found dead in his bed.219 When Adams
resumed his argument on March 1, he once again excoriated Forsyth and the
Administration for acquiescing to the demands of the Spanish government. 220 He
cited a letter of December 30, 1839 in which d'Argaiz had demanded that the
government transport the Africans to Cuba to be tried for murder. Adams professed
to find this demand an even more outrageous violation of human liberties and
international law than was the ambassador's earlier demand for the delivery of the
Africans to their owners or the custody of the Spanish ambassador. 22I Adams was
by the Executive, it was not for the want of a will to do it, or of a disposition to contest the claims put forth
in so extraordinary a manner upon our government." Id. at 35.
215 Id. at 33-36. Adams cited also a later letter from the ambassador stating that Forsyth's letter had
encouraged him to visit the United States Attorney in New York, who was reported to have received the
ambassador with great cordiality but explained that he could not interfere with the judicial process. Id. at 35-
36.
26 Does the Celestial Empire allow a proceeding like this?" Adams asked. "Is the Khan of Tartary possessed
of a power competent to meet demands like these? I know not where on the globe we should look for any
such authority, unless it be with the Governor General of Cuba with respect to negroes." Id. at 38.
217 X MEMOIRS, supra note 139, at 431.
218 Id. at 432.
219 Id.
220 ARGUMENT, supra note 207, at 59-66.
221 Id. at 62-63.
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further outraged that Forsyth had issued an opinion that the President should direct
a United States Marshal to deliver the Africans to the Spanish minister for trial.22a
Adams asked whether the precedent would "not have disabled forever the effective
power of the Habeas Corpus. "223 Adams likewise decried a later order of President
Van Buren commanding the Marshal to deliver the Africans to the Marshal
regardless of the pendency of judicial proceedings.22 4 He also attempted to demon-
strate that Cuba conducted an extensive slave trade that contravened Spanish law
225
and he drew upon his extensive knowledge of treaty law and practice to demonstrate
that slaves could not be included in cargo as property unless they were specifically
denominated as such. Adams also argued with vehemence that the government's
position would undermine the principle of habeas corpus by placing every American
at the discretion of executive caprice or tyranny. Adams went on to argue at some
length that the Supreme Court's decision in 1825 in the case of Antelope226 was
inapposite. 227 Although Adams acknowledged that the Court in that case had
recognized that international law permitted slavery and that the legality of the seizure
of a ship engaged in the slave trade depended on the law of that vessel's country,
Adams emphasized that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court had stated
that the opinion settled no principle and that it acknowledged that the slave trade
contravened the laws of nature. Adams also contended that the Amistad case was
distinguishable from the Antelope decision insofar as the blacks on the Amistad, in
contrast to the Africans captured from the Antelope, were never slaves and had been
kidnapped and taken to Cuba in violation of Spanish law.
228
Adams closed his argument on a personal note. Pointing out that he had
devoted little of his career to the law, Adams said that he had not imagined that he
ever again would appear before the Supreme Court. Yet, Adams observed, destiny
had let him to "appear again to plead the cause ofjustice, and now of liberty and life,
in behalf of my fellow men, before that same Court, which in a former age I had
addressed in support of the rights of property.' '229
Adams's argument drew mixed reviews. Although Adams's argument natu-
222 Id. at 74-75.
223 Id. at 80.
224 Id. at 80-82.
2215 Id. at 56-59.
226 23 U.S. (10 Wheaton) 66 (1825). See J.T. NOONAN, THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED
AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977).
227 ARGUMENT, supra note 207, at 94-134.
228 ld. at 116-17, 122, 131, 133. Although Adams correctly pointed out that Marshall had conceded that the
slave trade violated natural law, Professor White has pointed out that "[n]o natural law principles were
packed into constitutional language by the case; indeed, the use of an abstract natural justice argument as an
alternative ground for invalidating the slave trade was explicitly rejected. The decision left slavery as a
practice not only established but apparently invulnerable to attack from unwritten natural law arguments."
WHITE, supra note 177, at 703. The absence of precedent in favor of the natural law argument upon which
Adams relied in his argument in the Amistad case makes Adams's persistent appeals to an abstract justice
all the more extraordinary and underscores Adams's deep belief in the primacy of natural law.
229 Id. at 135.
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rally offended proponents of slavery, more telling criticism was registered by some
abolitionists who believed that Adams's appeal had been too emotional and political
and had lacked legal precision. 231 While Adams's arguments appear to have been
well received by the Court, the audience whose opinion was most important, the
effect of his argument upon the Court's seven-to-one decision in favor of the
Africans is problematical. Although Chief Justice Story praised Adams's argument
as "[e]xtraordinary, I say, for its power, for its bitter sarcasm, and its dealing with
topics far beyond the record and points of discussion," he also observed that Adams
had emphasized too many extraneous points. 231 Story's opinion for the Court
ignored Adams's sweeping appeals to the principles of justice and his contention that
the Van Buren Administration had unduly interfered in the case. The Court's
opinion rested primarily upon the rather narrow legal ground that the Africans were
free because the prosecution had failed to prove its claim that they were property.
Since they never had been slaves, the 1795 treaty between Spain and the United
States was not applicable. Story explained that the captives were natives of Africa
who were unlawfully kidnapped and unlawfully transported to Cuba in violation of
the laws, treaties, and edicts of Spain, which recently had "utterly abolished" the
African slave trade and deemed it a "heinous crime.' '232 Moreover, the claimants
had knowledge of those provisions. The Court also held that the treaty between the
United States and Spain provided no support for the claimants' contention that the
Court had no right to examine evidence beyond proof of Spanish ownership of the
vessel.
2 33
The impact of Adams's argument was further diluted by his failure to submit
his argument to the Supreme Court reporter in time for it to be published in the
Court's official Reports.23 4 Eventually, however, Adams's argument received wide
distribution as an abolitionist tract.
While Adams's argument in the case may have lacked intellectual precision,
Adams did not need to make a careful legalistic presentation since his co-counsel and
the brief already had informed the Court of the salient legal issues. Rather, Adams
did what he could best to do for the Africans' case: he brought the passion of their
cause to the Supreme Court, he appealed to the judges' sense of history and justice,
and he lent to the case the weight of his distinguished name.
The Amistad case marked the end of Adams's career at the bar, although he
would serve as Speaker of the House until his death in 1848. The case provided a
fitting end for a legal career that was more notable than Adams or many of his
biographers have recognized.
230 JONES, supra note 200, at 181-82.
23 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 348 (Story, William W., ed. 1851).
232 United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Peters) 518, 593 (1841).
233 Id. at 594-95.
234 JONES, supra note 200, at 192.
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CONCLUSION
Although John Quincy Adams attained considerable eminence at the bar, his
sporadic and often frustrating career as a lawyer was less distinguished than were his
accomplishments as a diplomat, statesman and man of letters. The influences of
Adams's experiences at the law on the development of his character and his political
career are better defined in negative than in positive terms.
Adams's legal education, for example, added little to the self-discipline and
intellectual attainments that he already had acquired long before he set forth for
Newburyport. Adams's early legal practice likewise provided few skills or personal
contacts that were useful to him in his political career. Adams's experiences of
studying and practicing law were useful to Adams, however, insofar as they con-
vinced him that his real interests were literary and political. His relatively lean first
years of legal practice also afforded him the leisure to pursue his literary interests and
to undertake political activities that helped lead to political office. Although
Adams's second career at the bar was more eventful and distinguished, success at the
bar seems only to have confirmed Adams's conviction that his real interests and
talents were political rather than legal. Similarly, Adams's role in the Amistad case
underscored his essential impatience with the law and his predilection to see legal
issues from a political perspective.
Adams's preference for politics was sealed by his rejection of a Supreme Court
appointment. Adams is to be commended for having sufficient candor and respect
for the Court to admit that he was temperamentally and perhaps intellectually
unsuited for service on the High Bench and that his presence there would unduly
politicize the Court. It is unfortunate that certain other nominees have lacked
comparable courage and independence. The irony is that Adams's erudition,
conscientiousness and sound devotion to republican principles suggest that he might
have made an outstanding justice.
The difficulty of demonstrating that Adams's legal career had any significant
impact upon his political career underscores the difficulty of making broad conclu-
sions about the effects of legal training upon the performance of presidents.
Although Adams's legal training surely provided him with some useful technical
skills and perhaps made him better able to select highly qualified Supreme Court
justices, Adams's legal training and practice ultimately seems to have little impact
upon his presidency. Moreover, Adams's willingness to propound a nationalistic
program that was far ahead of its time tends to belie the theory that lawyer-presidents
are unduly legalistic. So many other factors influenced Adams's presidency that it
is well nigh impossible to isolate the impact of Adams's legal experiences. Adams's
career suggests, however, that there may be a conflict between the plodding qualities
necessary for a successful career at the bar and the more dynamic qualities necessary
for a successful political career.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMSSpring, 1990]
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